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Abstract
This dissertation takes a distributional approach to examining dietary quality in the
United States. Diet quality is a direct input to health, is often used as a proxy for well-
being, and is an outcome variable for a wide variety of economic interventions. This
makes diet quality a particularly important, yet understudied, outcome for program
evaluation and describing food bundles that individuals choose.
The first chapter describes the evolution of adult dietary quality in the U.S. over
the last two decades. Contrary to popular wisdom, there have been statistically signifi-
cant improvements at all levels of diet quality. For the population as a whole, we find
significant improvements across all levels of diet quality. Further, we find improvements
for both low-income and higher-income individuals alike. Counterfactual distributions
of dietary quality are constructed to investigate the extent to which observed improve-
ments can be attributed to changes in the nutritional content of foods and to changes in
population characteristics. We find that 63% of the improvement for all adults can be
attributed to changes in food formulation and demographics. Changes in food formu-
lation account for a substantially larger percentage of the dietary improvement within
the lower-income population (19.6%) as compared to their higher-income counterpart
(6.4%). The sheer myriad of overlapping policies and public awareness initiatives during
this time period make it difficult to pin down the exact causes behind such improve-
ments. This chapter motivates two program evaluation studies in the two chapters that
follow.
The second chapter estimates distributional effects of food consumed at school and
away from home on child dietary quality. Using a fixed-effects quantile estimator, two
non-consecutive days of food intake are used to identify the effect of eating away from
home and at school. I find considerable heterogeneity in the estimated impacts. The
study finds that food away from home, as compared to home-prepared food, has a neg-
ative impact on the distribution of dietary quality except at low quantiles. Main results
suggest that school food has both positive and negative impacts across the distribution
of dietary quality. I find positive impacts on dietary quality at low quantiles of the
outcome distribution, whereas food from school has a negative impact at the upper
iii
end of the distribution of diet quality. While food consumed under the National School
Lunch and Breakfast Programs may not benefit every child, especially the average child,
it does improve the diets of many children who otherwise would have poorer dietary
quality. The implication is that U.S. schools are fertile grounds to improve nutrition
skill formation, especially for the most nutritionally disadvantaged.
This final chapter estimates the effect of replacing food assistance benefits, which
typically come in the form of a food voucher, for an equal value of cash on the quantity
and quality of food consumed in a household. We utilize an experiment in which a
portion of beneficiaries were chosen at random to receive their benefits in the form of
cash. We take a distributional approach because we believe it is important to analyze
low-consuming households separate from high-consuming households. We find some
evidence that a cash system would increase kilocalorie consumption in the portion of the
distribution below recommended levels of consumption and decrease consumption in the
portion of the distribution well above any reasonable threshold. This finding implies that
a cash transfer system may both alleviate food insecurity and decrease overconsumption.
The cash system appears to have a positive impact on the distribution of dietary quality
in quantiles above 40. Virtually all of the improvement in quality comes from a decrease
in consumption of less-healthy foods by the cash receiving group. Overall, these findings
imply that beneficiaries are no worse off under a cash transfer system and in fact, may
be better off.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1
2Diet-related illness and disease not only generate direct individual medical costs
but also create negative externalities in the form of higher health insurance premiums,
greater public health care expenditures, losses in worker-productivity and lower tax
revenues (Cawley, 2004). Nutrition in general is highly correlated with four of ten
major causes of death in the United States: coronary heart disease, cancer, stroke, and
type 2 diabetes (Jemal et al., 2008). The quality of one’s diet specifically is associated
with increased risks of coronary heart disease, stroke and diabetes (Chiuve et al., 2012),
cardiovascular disease (Nicklas, O’Neil and Fulgoni, 2012) and many types of cancer
(Bosire et al., 2013; Reedy et al., 2008; Shahril, 2012). Therefore, it is important to
monitor and understand how Americans’ diet quality changes as we learn more about
its importance to health and productivity.
Understanding and improving dietary quality has been a longstanding policy ini-
tiative of the U.S. Federal government. In 1977, the Federal Government issued its
first official recommendations: the Dietary Goals for Americans (USDA, 2008). These
recommendations later became the Dietary Guidelines for Americans (DGA) in 1980
and are now in their seventh incarnation, the 2010 DGA. Most recently, major informa-
tional campaigns have included the Food Guide Pyramid released in 1992 (subsequently
updated in 2005 as the MyPyramid and in 2011 as the MyPlate) and the 1994 nutrition
label mandate.
Given the complexity of the linkages between diet and health, as well as the broad
implications diet has on policy formation, it is important to better understand the
interplay between diet quality and various nutrition assistance programs. Nutrition
assistance programs make up over half of the total Farm bill, with the Supplemental
Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP) garnering roughly half while the school food
programs make up about another 10%. These two programs in particular are under
constant scrutiny and evaluation. This dissertation will look at (1) how diet quality has
changed over the past twenty years and what has contributed to these changes, (2) how
SNAP could impact diet quality (and quantity) under a cash transfer system rather
than its current voucher system and (3) how the school food programs stack up against
home prepared meals.
In all analyses, I use a measure of diet quality developed by the U.S. Department
of Agriculture as my main metric – the Healthy Eating Index-2005. This particular
3measure has be shown to be highly correlated with other measures of diet quality and
correlates well with diet-related disease (see Chiuve et al., 2012). I take a distributional
approach in each chapter because I believe it is important to analyze low dietary quality
individuals separate from high dietary quality individuals. In each case, the distribu-
tional approach proves to be a valuable tool in analyzing the effects in the tails of the
outcome distribution.
Chapter 2
Is Diet Quality Improving?
Distributional Changes in the
United States, 1989–2008
4
52.1 Introduction
Poor nutrition is a contributing factor to four of ten major causes of death in the United
States: coronary heart disease, cancer, stroke, and type 2 diabetes (Jemal et al., 2008).
Poor diet quality is associated with increased risks of coronary heart disease, stroke
and diabetes (Chiuve et al., 2012), cardiovascular disease (Nicklas, O’Neil and Fulgoni,
2012), breast cancer (Shahril, 2012), colorectal cancer (Reedy et al., 2008) and prostate
cancer (Bosire et al., 2013). Moreover, diet quality is often used as a measure of well-
being in developing countries (Ravaillon, 1996) and developed countries (Strauss and
Duncan, 1998). In this paper, we study how the distribution of adult diet quality in the
United States has evolved over the last two decades.
Improving dietary quality has long been a focus of government policy because of
its direct impact on human health, particularly among the poor. Specific interventions
have included increasing the resources available to households to buy food (e.g., Supple-
mental Nutrition Assistance Program–SNAP)1 and providing healthy foods directly to
individuals (e.g., the School Breakfast Program, School Lunch Program, Special Sup-
plemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children–WIC, and Fresh Fruit
and Vegetable Program). Policies have also aimed at increasing the information avail-
able to individuals about what constitutes a healthy diet: the Food Guide Pyramid was
released in 1992 and subsequently updated in 2005 as the MyPyramid and in 2011 as
the MyPlate, Federally approved SNAP-Education programs grew from 7 active States
in 1992 to 50 in 2004, mandatory nutrition labeling was enacted in 1994 and mandatory
calorie postings in restaurants was introduced in 2011. Current policy proposals seek to
improve diet quality by restricting the range of foods eligible for purchase under SNAP
and change the relative prices of foods via taxes or subsidies.
In this paper, we use stochastic dominance to compare the distribution of dietary
quality over time and between income groups. Stochastic dominance is frequently used
in the economics literature to analyze the distribution of income or wealth. This empir-
ical approach allows us to completely characterize the nature of the changes in dietary
quality over time, paying close attention to low-income individuals, whose diets are of
particular concern to policymakers. Stochastic dominance is particularly well suited to
1The Food and Nutrition Act of 2008 specifically aims “to provide for improved levels of nutrition
among low-income households.”
6studying diet quality, where exact thresholds between “good” diets and “poor” diets is
fuzzy.
Further, we construct counterfactual distributions of dietary quality to investigate
the extent to which observed improvements can be attributed to changes in the nutri-
tional content of foods and to changes in demographics. In short, we ask how would
the distribution of dietary quality change if food in 1989 were formulated in as it was in
2008? Further, what would have the distribution of dietary quality looked like in 1989
had the demographic landscape of 2008 prevailed?
When comparing the observed distributions of dietary quality, we find a statistically
significant and economically meaningful improvement across the entire population over
the period 1989–2008. Improvements occur for individuals in households above and
below our chosen poverty threshold. Counterfactual estimates indicate that 53.3 percent
of the dietary improvement in the U.S. population can be attributed to changes in
demographics (i.e., an aging, more educated, and ethnically diverse population) and an
additional 10.1 percent of the improvement is attributed to changes in food composition
(e.g., decreases in saturated fats, sugars and sodium). The residual 36.6 percent is
unexplained by either changes in demographics or food composition.
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin by describing a widely used measure of
dietary quality – the Healthy Eating Index (HEI-2005) – that forms the basis of our
analysis. We then turn to a description of our primary data sources, the National Health
and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) and the earlier Continuing Survey of
Food Intakes by Individuals (CSFII); we extend the HEI-2005 to the earlier study period
1989-91. We then motivate our empirical approach by providing a brief overview of
stochastic dominance. Following the presentation of results, we discuss the economic
and policy implications in the final section.
2.2 Measuring Diet Quality
The healthfulness of an individual’s diet depends on two factors: energy balance and
dietary quality. Energy balance is the relationship between calories consumed and energy
expended, which results in body weight management (Hall et al., 2012). Dietary quality
can be expressed as a per calorie metric that measures the degree to which a diet complies
7with a set of criteria (here, the Dietary Guidelines for Americans via the Healthy Eating
Index). In this paper, we focus on dietary quality, and we note that there is evidence
that higher quality diets are associated with decreased obesity rates (Epstein et al. 2001,
2008), i.e. improved energy balance.
Each chapter of this dissertation uses the Healthy Eating Index (HEI) – developed
in 1995 in order to measure compliance with the U.S. government’s recommendations
for healthful eating – as the measure of diet quality. The HEI has been widely used
and evaluated as a valid measure of diet quality (Guenther et al., 2008). In the medical
literature it has been found to be a significant predictor of medical outcomes, notably
of all cause mortality, mortality due to malignant neoplasms (Ford et al., 2011), and
overweight and obesity (Guo et al., 2004). Further, the HEI has been extensively used
by economists to measure the outcome of policy interventions, for example Welfare Re-
form (Kramer-LeBlanc, Basiotis and Kennedy, 1997), School Breakfast Program (Bhat-
tacharya, Currie and Haider, 2006), Food Stamps and WIC (Wilde, McNamara and
Ranney, 1999), nutrition labeling (Kim, Nayga and Capps, 2001) and unusually cold
weather (Bhattacharya et al., 2003). Finally, it is has also been found to be associated
with food insecurity (Bhattacharya, Currie and Haider, 2004) and has been proposed
as a possible indicator of food deserts (Bitler and Haider, 2011).
Every five years the Dietary Guidelines for Americans (DGA) are revised by the
U.S. Departments of Agriculture (USDA) and Health and Human Services (HHS), based
on the advice of an expert advisory panel. These guidelines are the U.S. Government’s
official recommendations for healthful eating and form the basis for information provided
to consumers. Many of the USDA’s food-assistance programs must be in compliance
with the DGA. The HEI was updated in 2005 to reflect the 2005 DGA (frequently called
the HEI-2005, see Guenther, Reedy and Krebs-Smith, 2008).2 Because the HEI-2005
was constructed with the 2005 DGA as its basis, one can think of using this index as a
consistent measure of dietary quality with 2005 defined as the base period.
The HEI (henceforth, HEI refers to the HEI-2005) is the sum of 12 components based
on consumption of various foods or nutrients. Each component assigns a score ranging
from 0 to 5 (total fruit, whole fruit, total vegetables, dark green/orange vegetables and
2For a comprehensive review of dietary indices see Kant (1996) and Kourlaba and Panagiotakos
(2009).
8legumes, total grains, whole grains), 0 to 10 (milk, meats and beans, oils, saturated fat,
sodium) or 0 to 20 for the percentage of calories from solid fats, alcoholic beverages, and
added sugars (SoFAAS) creating a maximum score of 100. Table C.1 provides exact
details of the scoring.
Table 2.1: Healthy Eating Index-2005 Standards for Scoring.
Score
Component 0 5 8 10 20
Total fruit 0 −→ ≥ 0.8 cup eq/1000 kcal
Whole fruit 0 −→ ≥ 0.4 cup eq/1000 kcal
Total vegetables 0 −→ ≥ 1.1 cup eq/1000 kcal
Dark green/orange veg. 0 −→ ≥ 0.4 cup eq/1000 kcal
Total grains 0 −→ ≥ 3.0 cup eq/1000 kcal
Whole grains 0 −→ ≥ 1.5 cup eq/1000 kcal
Milk 0 −−−−−−−−−−−−→ ≥ 1.3 cup eq/1000 kcal
Meats and beans 0 −−−−−−−−−−−−→ ≥ 2.5 oz eq/1000 kcal
Oils 0 −−−−−−−−−−−−→ ≥ 12 g/1000 kcal
Saturated fat ≥ 15 −−−−−→ 10 −−→ ≤ 7% of energy
Sodium ≥ 2.0 −−−−−→ 1.1−−→ ≤ 0.7 g/1000 kcal
Calories from SoFAASa ≥ 50 −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ ≤ 20% of energy
Source: Recreated from Guenther et al. (2007).
aSolid Fat, Alcohol, and Added Sugar
There is debate among nutritionists about how a given HEI score maps into the
notion of “healthy” versus “unhealthy” diet quality. One generally accepted rule of
thumb is that total scores of more than 80 are considered “good,” scores of 51-80 as
“needs improvement,” and scores of less than 51 as “poor.” Characterizing a diet based
on a single cut-off is difficult (analogous to characterizing what it means to be poor based
on a poverty line). A key advantage of the stochastic dominance methods used in this
research is that they allow general statements about improvements in dietary quality
over time or between subpopulations without having to define a specific threshold.
It is worth repeating that the components of the HEI are density based (the ratio
of an individual’s component intake to their total calorie intake) rather than quantity
based. By design, the HEI measures the relative quality of foods consumed, indepen-
dent of total calories (and of energy expenditure). We use the total HEI score as the
9underlying metric of interest in this study for two reasons. First the HEI score has been
extensively validated and tested as a measure of diet quality (Guenther et al., 2008).
Second, joint tests of dominance are limited in practice to two or three dimensions,
rather than the dozen component scores that make up the HEI.3
2.3 Data
Our sample uses nationally representative, repeated cross-sectional, individual food in-
take data from two surveys: the Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by Individuals
(CSFII, 1989-91 and 1994-96), and the continuous waves of the National Health and Nu-
trition Examination Survey (NHANES, 2001-08). In both surveys, respondents report
24-hour dietary intakes and demographic information including income and household
size.4 Each survey wave is an independently drawn sample, which is representative of
the U.S. with the USDA overseeing the food intake component in both surveys. Finally,
for consistency across samples, we focus on adults 20 years and older.
The HEI-2005 is calculated by linking the USDA’s MyPyramid Equivalents Database
(MPED) to food intake surveys. The MPED decomposes individual foods into MyPyra-
mid guideline equivalents so that each HEI component can be computed as shown in
table C.1. As noted above, because there is no officially released MPED for the 1989-91
CSFII, the HEI-2005 has not been previously computed for surveys prior to 1994. Of
the 3,953 unique foods reported by adults 20 and older on day one in the 1989-91 CSFII,
3,907 (98.8 percent) of these foods are also reported in the 1994-96 CSFII. We therefore
use the 1994-96 MPED to calculate the HEI-2005 for individuals in 1989-91.5
We classify individuals as low-income if household income falls below 185-percent
of the Federal Poverty Guidelines. This is a policy relevant threshold that serves as
3Duclos, Sahn and Younger (2006) provide a thorough discussion of multidimensional orderings using
stochastic dominance. Alkire and Foster (2011) propose an alternative “counting” method that enables
one to examine many dimensions with the caveat of having to choose a threshold a priori.
4For all surveys but the 2001-02 NHANES, a second day of dietary intake was obtained. In keeping
with standard practice, we analyze the first day of intake. One alternative is to average day 1 and
2 intakes where available. Another approach is to estimate models of usual intake (see, Dodd et al.,
2006). Assuming that measurement bias and within person variation, if present, is consistent across
survey waves, our results are invariant to usual intake methods. As shown in the supplementary appendix
online, results are robust to using two days of intake.
5The supplementary appendix online contains a description of how to map the MPED for 1994-96
CSFII to the 1989-91 CSFII in greater detail.
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an upper bound on the cutoff for many Federal nutrition assistance programs. During
our sample period, the cutoff for SNAP is 130 percent and 185 percent for WIC. The
Federal Poverty Guidelines are also used as an eligibility criterion for the National School
Lunch Program, School Breakfast Program, Child and Adult Care Food Program, and
the Expanded Food and Nutrition Education Program.6 Table 2.2 reports the mean HEI
scores for the population as a whole and for individuals above and below 185 percent
of the poverty line for each of the periods in our sample.7
Table 2.2: Healthy Eating Index–2005 Summary Statistics
Population 1989-91 1994-96 2001-04 2005-08
U.S. population 50.16 (13.97)a 51.10 (13.88)a 51.50 (11.91) 52.46 (12.49)
[10.09, 96.42] [10.69, 97.47] [13.52, 99.46] [8.78, 95.38]
N 9,498 9,867 8,640 9,258
Low-income 48.96 (19.83)a 49.36 (15.45)a 49.65 (13.29)a 51.37 (14.99)
[10.09, 90.25] [10.69, 93.81] [15.08, 99.46] [8.78, 94.60]
N 4,965 3,433 3,551 3,857
Higher-income 50.56 (11.19)ab 51.73 (13.16)ab 52.36 (11.09)b 52.92 (11.29)b
[11.51, 96.42] [13.63, 97.47] [13.52, 93.97] [10.00, 95.38]
N 4,533 6,434 5,089 5,401
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Maxima and minima in brackets.
aWithin-population mean is significantly lower than 2005-08 at the 5-percent level.
bWithin-year higher-income mean is significantly different from low-income at the 5-percent level.
Table 2.2 shows a consistent pattern of increasing dietary quality across groups
over time. Comparing the most recent period 2005-08 to the earlier periods, we see
a significant increase (at the 5-percent level) for the population at large over 1989-91
and 1994-96. Low-income individuals appear to have a stagnant HEI score over 1989–
2004, and then a significant increase in 2005-08. We also compare low and higher-income
6Federal Poverty Guidelines are updated each year to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index
for Urban consumers (CPI-U) and are a function of household income and size (U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, 2013).
7There are various ways to calculate the HEI score for a population of interest (see Freedman et al.
(2008, 2010) for in-depth discussions). Because we are interested in the number and depth of individuals
below a particular HEI score, we use the mean score of individuals instead of an alternative measure
score of the population ratio. The mean score is computed by calculating each individual’s HEI score
and then averaging over the population, whereas the score of the population ratio is calculated as the
population’s total component intake over total calorie intake and then calculating each score from this
population ratio.
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individuals within year and find that higher-income individuals have significantly higher
mean HEI scores for all years in the data, though in the final year of the data the mean
HEI gap between groups is smallest.
2.4 Stochastic Dominance
We have seen that mean HEI scores have increased for all groups over the interval 1989–
2008. But does the mean HEI obscure variation in dietary quality across individuals?
For example, is the increase in diet quality due to general improvements across the
population at a steady rate or due to larger improvements amongst those with the
lowest (or highest) diet quality? To address these possibilities, we study the entire
distribution of dietary quality for groups of interest using an approach common in the
study of income and well-being, stochastic dominance.8
2.4.1 Definitions
Consider two distributions of HEI scores with cumulative distribution functions FA(z)
and FB(z), for a population of interest in two distinct time periods, or alternatively
for two mutually exclusive subpopulations within a single time period. We say that
distribution B first-order stochastically dominates (FOSD) distribution A if
FB(z) ≤ FA(z) ∀ z
with strict inequality for some z. In other words, no matter where the threshold for
“healthy” is set, a greater share of the population characterized by distribution B have
a “healthy” diet. This relationship is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 2.1.
8Stochastic dominance approaches have also been used to study changes in body mass index (Madden,
2011) and environmental quality (Maasoumi and Millimet, 2005), and extended to qualitative health
measures (Allison and Foster, 2004).
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Figure 2.1: First and second order stochastic dominance
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Distributional studies of well-being often look to higher orders of stochastic dom-
inance, notably second-order stochastic dominance (SOSD). While FOSD counts the
number of individuals falling below a given ‘healthy diet threshold’ (which would in
turn determine the “headcount ratio”), SOSD captures the depth, or severity of inade-
quate diets. SOSD is sensitive to the extent to which diets fall in the lower tails of the
distribution.
To formally define SOSD, let D1A(z) = FA(z), and likewise for B, so that FOSD of B
over A can be written as D1B(z) ≤ D1A(z). FB will second order stochastically dominate
FA if ∫ z
0
[
D1B (y)−D1A (y)
]
dy ≤ 0 ∀ z
with a strict inequality for some value of z. This relationship is illustrated in the right
panel of Figure 2.1 which shows that the CDFs cross thereby ruling out FOSD over
the entire range of HEI. The integrated difference between FA and FB, shown in the
subpanel, is strictly positive, and thus FB second-order stochastically dominates FA.
More generally, dominance at order s of B over A is then defined as DsB(z) ≤ DsA(z)
where,
Dsj (z) =
∫ z
0
Ds−1j (y)dy ∀ z for j = A,B
with a strict inequality for some value of z.
Stochastic dominance maps into social welfare under fairly standard assumptions
about the utility derived from a healthy diet (Deaton, 1997). For example, if B FOSD
A then for any social welfare functionW defined on the distribution of diet quality F (z)
such that W(F ) = ∫ U(z)dF (z) where U is any monotonically nondecreasing utility
function of z (U ′ ≥ 0), it must be true that social welfare derived from distribution B
will be at least as high as the welfare derived from A. We can extend the mapping of
social welfare to SOSD by requiring U to be nondecreasing and concave in z (U ′ ≥ 0,
U ′′ ≤ 0). Note that because dominance of order s implies dominance of order s + 1,
it follows that the latter is a less stringent condition. Thus, welfare implications are
the strongest in the first-order case. Finally, we also make the standard assumption of
anonymity, so that each individual is weighted equally in the social welfare function.
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2.4.2 Estimation
A useful expression for Dsj (z) in empirical analyses is (Davidson and Duclos, 2000):
Dsj (z) =
1
(s− 1)!
∫ z
0
(z − y)s−1dFj(y). (2.1)
Integrating the empirical analogue of (2.1) by parts leads to a natural estimator of Dsj (z)
Dˆsj (z) =
1
Nˆj(s− 1)!
nj∑
i=1
θi(z − yi)s−1I(yi ≤ z) (2.2)
where we account for complex survey design (e.g., CFSII and NHANES) by letting θi
be an individual’s sample weight, Nˆj =
∑nj
i=1 θi is the population size in distribution j
(with corresponding sample size nj), and I(·) is the indicator function. The first-order
case leads to the empirical CDF
Dˆ1j (z) = Fˆj(z) =
1
Nˆj
nj∑
i=1
θiI(yi ≤ z) (2.3)
and the statistic for the second order case follows directly.
2.4.3 Inference
We are interested in testing the hypothesis that the distribution of dietary quality in one
time period dominates the distribution in another time period. For example, allowing
distribution FB be the more recent time period, the null hypothesis of an increase in
dietary quality at order s ∈ {1, 2} is,
Hs+0 : D
s
B(z) ≤ DsA(z) ∀ z vs. Hs+a : DsB(z) > DsA(z) for at least one z
where the positive superscript denotes the hypothesis of dietary improvement. Whereas
in testing the null hypothesis that dietary quality has decreased (denoted by Hs−0 ), the
signs would be reversed. One could also posit a null of equality but notice that rejection
of both Hs+0 and H
s−
0 implies rejecting equality.
Bishop, Formby and Thistle (1989, hereafter BFT) propose a multiple testing pro-
cedure by hypothesizing dominance in both directions. That is, testing the null of Hs+0
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and Hs−0 versus their respective alternatives and drawing inferences from the combined
acceptance/rejection. A variety of approaches to drawing inferences based on the BFT
procedure have been proposed, such as multiple comparison tests (Anderson, 1996;
Davidson and Duclos, 2000) or Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) type tests (McFadden, 1989;
Barrett and Donald, 2003; Linton, Massoumi, and Whang, 2005; Bennett, 2013). Multi-
ple comparison approaches are based on arbitrarily chosen ordinates, which can lead to
test inconsistency (Davidson and Duclos, 2000; Barrett and Donald, 2003). Therefore,
in this study we use a KS type statistic that compares all objects within the support of
the two distributions.
Let Z be defined as the union of the supports of A and B. Define the following
functionals for each order s
dˆ+s = sup
z∈Z
[DˆsB(z)− DˆsA(z)] (2.4)
dˆ−s = sup
z∈Z
[DˆsA(z)− DˆsB(z)]. (2.5)
Notice that that the null hypotheses can be rewritten in terms of these functionals.
That is, the null of increased diet quality (FB dominating FA) at order s is simply
Hs+0 : dˆ
+
s ≤ 0, and similarly for decreased diet quality (FA dominating FB) using dˆ−s .
When the distributions are mutually independent, KS-type tests based on dˆ±s are con-
sistent (McFadden, 1989).9 Test statistics are calculated using,
Tˆ±s =
√
nAnB
nA + nB
dˆ±s . (2.6)
Because there are infinitely many FA(z) satisfying the null such that FB(z) ≤ FA(z),
the limiting null distribution is not uniquely defined and depends on the underlying
unknown distributions of FA and FB. We follow Barrett and Donald (2003) and use
the least favorable configuration (LFC) to construct the null distribution. The LFC is
the point in the null distribution that is least favorable to the alternative hypothesis
9The independence assumption seems reasonable given that our data are repeated cross-sections in
which sampling units are independently drawn in each survey (see Bhattacharya (2007) for a more
detailed discussion) and that some surveys were separated by nearly 20 years in time. In section 6,
we relax this assumption to ignorability (also called, conditional independence or unconfoundedness) to
construct aggregate counterfactual decompositions.
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(i.e., FA = FB). As a result, the test is conservative; rejection of the null under the
LFC implies rejection at any point in the null distribution. We construct a bootstrap
distribution of Tˆ±s to simulate the p-values.
We use a recentering bootstrap approach, which has been shown to perform well
against alternative methods (see, Barrett and Donald, 2003; Linton, Maasoumi and
Whang, 2005). Let Dˆs∗j (z) be defined as above from (2.2) but computed on a random
bootstrap sample drawn with replacement from distribution j.10 The statistic is recen-
tered by the observed values so that we have Dˆs∗jc (z) = Dˆ
s∗
j (z) − Dˆsj (z). We can then
define recentered bootstrap functionals dˆ∗±s by replacing Dˆsj (z) with Dˆ
s∗
jc (z) in (2.4) and
(2.5). The recentered bootstrap t-statistics are
Tˆ ∗±s =
√
nAnB
nA + nB
dˆ∗±s .
We approximate p-values from the distribution of bootstrapped test statistics by
pˆ±s '
1
B
B∑
i=1
I(Tˆ ∗±s > Tˆ
±
s ). (2.7)
The p-values allow for a test of stochastic dominances at order s based on the rule “reject
Hs±0 if pˆ
±
s < α” where α represents the conventional levels of statistical significance.
Thus under the BFT procedure, rejection of the null Hs−0 in favor of H
s−
a coupled with
a failure to reject Hs+0 is viewed as statistical evidence in favor of FB dominated FA at
order s.
2.4.4 Robustness Check for First Order Stochastic Dominance
To determine the stochastic rankings of two distributions, we must distinguish between
four possible true states of nature: the distributions are equal, A lies above B, A lies
10Our samples are constructed using multi-stage stratification where each stratum is clustered by two
primary sampling units (PSUs). Test statistics based on a simple random bootstrap samples drawn with
replacement would be biased and inconsistent. Under the CSFII and NHANES survey design, Rao, Wu,
and Yue (1992) show that bootstrap replicate weights can be obtained by randomly picking one PSU
within each stratum and internally rescaling the sample weights. We use the user written Stata package
bsweights (Kolenikov, 2010) to automate the rescaling process to create B = 1, 000 balanced replicate
weights θ∗i for each sample individual. These weights are used in equation (2.2) to create the bootstrap
distribution of Tˆ ∗±s .
17
below B, or the curves cross. The BFT procedure described above distinguishes be-
tween these four states by conducting two one-sided tests. The result is lower power in
detecting a crossing of the CDFs, which could lead to over-classification of dominance
(Dardanoni and Forcian, 1999; Gastwirth and Nayak, 1999). This is at least partially
due to the fact that rejection of H1+0 or H
1−
0 by itself is consistent with both FOSD and
a crossing; hence, the use of two one-sided tests to rule out the crossing under the BFT
procedure.
A second drawback to the BFT procedure is how the total error probability α is
apportioned to each one-sided test (Dardanoni and Forcian, 1999). As is typical with
standard hypothesis testing, the one-sided critical value c(α) is based on ensuring that
the probability of committing a Type I error (i.e., rejecting H1+0 , H
1−
0 , or both when
they are true) is less than the nominal level α. But as noted by Dardanoni and Forcian
(1999), the BFT procedure does not allow one to control how the total error probability
α is allocated to each classification (equality, dominance in one direction, dominance in
the opposite direction, or a crossing).
Bennett (2013) improves on the BFT procedure by writing it as a two-stage test
that allows one to test for a crossing while giving the researcher flexibility in allocating
the total error rate to each stage. Let α and β denote a pair of pre-specified significance
levels for the first and second stage respectively. The first stage is to posit a null of
equality (FA = FB) and determine rejection or acceptance based on the critical value
a(α). If we accept the null, then we infer that the distributions are indistinguishable.
Upon rejection, however, the second stage determines the state of nature among the
three alternatives (A dominates B, B dominates A, or they cross) using the critical
value b(α, β). This allows β to be the portion of the total error probability α allocated
to a crossing (i.e., αβ) and the remaining α(1 − β) is split evenly between dominance
in either direction.
Bennett (2013) tabulates asymptotic critical values of a(α) and b(α, β) for frequently
used significant levels. In the applications below, we wish to calculate the asymptotic
p-values. To do so, we need to pre-set the total error rate α, the level at which we
are controlling for falsely rejecting equality. We use two levels of significance (10 and
1 percent) so that the second stage is robust to our choice of α. The associated a(α)
critical values are a(0.1) = 1.2239 and a(0.01) = 1.6277 (see, table 1 in Bennett, 2013).
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The maximum of the one-sided test statistics found in (2.6) is used in the first stage
and the minimum is used in the second stage. To simplify notation, let these statistics
be Kmax = max{Tˆ+1 , Tˆ−1 } and Kmin = min{Tˆ+1 , Tˆ−1 }, respectively. We are interested
in the distribution of Kmin conditional on rejecting equality. In other words, if Kmin is
“large enough” (i.e., larger than the second stage critical value b(α, β)) conditional on
Kmax > a(α), then we reject the null in favor of a crossing. Asymptotically, as shown
in proposition 2.6 in Bennett (2013), if FA = FB and b < a then
lim
nA,nB→∞
P[Kmin ≤ b|Kmax > a]→ 2[G1(b)−G(a, b)]
1−G2(a) (2.8)
where11
G1(b) = 1− e−2b2
G2(a) =
√
2pi
a
∞∑
k=1
e−(2k−1)
2pi2/(8a)2
G(a, b) =
∞∑
k=−∞
e−2(k(a+b))
2 −
∞∑
k=−∞
e−2(a+k(a+b))
2
.
The two-stage p-values (denoted p2S1,α) are calculated from (2.8) where we use two levels
of α. Thus, a p2S1,α value below conventional levels of significance is evidence that the dis-
tributions cross. Put differently, larger p-values are consistent with the null hypothesis
that the distributions do not cross.
2.5 Results
Our main results are summarized in tables 2.3 and 2.4, and depicted in figures 2.2–
2.4. Tables report the bootstrapped p-values for tests of increases and decreases in
diet quality (Barrett and Donald, 2003), as well as the asymptotic two-stage p-values
(Bennett, 2013). The final column summarizes the inferred ranking of distributions
based on these tests. In short, we find that there has been a statistically significant and
11The G(·) functions where taken from an earlier version of the two-stage test (Bennett, 2010). G1(b)
is derived from the K-S distribution. We present G2(a) as a numerical approximation to the K-S
cumulative distribution. As referenced in Bennett (2013), Billingsley (1968, p. 85) shows the closed-
form expression of G(a, b).
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economically important improvement in the HEI scores over the period under study;
Americans at all ranges of dietary quality are consuming a higher quality diet in 2005–
2008 than they were in 1989–1991. However, there are differences between income
groups with regards to when and where the improvements occurred (table 2.5).
2.5.1 Between Periods
Figure 2.2 shows the empirical CDFs for the U.S. adult population in each period.
Distributions shift systematically to the right over time, in other words towards a more
nutritious diet. Because the shifts are relatively small, in this and subsequent figures,
we present the estimated difference between the earliest period (1989-91) and the latest
period (2005-08) in a sub-panel. The area under the difference curve in the sub-panel is
equal to the area between the distributions. We can see the twenty-year improvement
was positive and pointwise statistically significant for the empirically relevant range of
HEI scores.
Figure 2.2: Distribution of adult HEI-2005 scores in the U.S. population
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Notes: Confidence intervals are calculated pointwise by bootstrapping. See online appendix for this
figure in color.
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From the first three rows of table 2.3, we see that in comparing 1989-91 to all
subsequent periods the null of decreasing dietary quality is strongly rejected and in no
case do we reject the null of an increase in diet quality. In comparing 1994-96 and
2001-04, we are unable to order the distributions in either the first or second order case.
We do find strong evidence that 2005-08 FOSD 1994-96, but the results are fairly weak
with regards to an ordering of 2005-08 and 2001-04.
Table 2.3: Tests of Stochastic Dominance among U.S. Adults
Distribution Bootstrap Tests Two-stage Inferred
A B pˆ−1 pˆ
−
2 pˆ
+
1 pˆ
+
2 p
2S
1,0.1 p
2S
1,0.01 Ranking
1989-91 1994-96 0.007 0.010 0.900 0.660 0.507 0.362 A ≺1 B∗∗∗
2001-04 0.028 0.002 1.000 0.937 0.999 0.999 A ≺1 B∗∗
2005-08 0.002 0.000 1.000 0.877 0.981 0.966 A ≺1 B∗∗∗
1994-96 2001-04 0.129 0.149 0.383 0.925 0.003 0.001 ND
2005-08 0.010 0.003 0.999 0.863 0.981 0.965 A ≺1 B∗∗∗
2001-04 2005-08 0.133 0.051 0.991 0.790 0.972 0.950 A ≺2 B∗
Notes: The pˆ±s values refer to one-sided tests of the null hypothesis H
±
s using equation (2.7).
The asymptotic p2S1,α values are calculated from (2.8), where α = 0.1, 0.01. The notation
A ≺s B reads “Distribution B dominates distribution A at order s,” while ND indicates
no dominance at order 1 or 2. Inferred ranking is based on statistical significance levels of
∗∗∗1, ∗∗5, and ∗10%.
Some care is required in interpreting the last two columns of table 2.3, as they report
results from Bennet’s two-stage test described in section 2.4.4. As noted above, these
p-values are for the null hypothesis that the CDFs do not cross, as determined by both
Kmax and Kmax being statistically large. Loosely speaking, these can be interpreted
as the (conditional) probability of rejecting the hypothesis of no crossing. Thus, a p2S1,α
value below conventional levels of significance can be interpreted as evidence that the
distributions cross. Bennet’s two-stage test supports the main findings above in that
there is no statistical evidence that the 1989-91 distribution crosses any of the later
years.
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2.5.2 Between Income Groups
We now turn our attention to direct comparisons of individuals above and below 185%
of the poverty guideline. As noted above, we choose 185% of the poverty line as our cut-
off because it is an upper limit on the threshold for many federal nutrition assistance
programs.12 Panel (a) of figure 2.3 presents the empirical CDFs and the difference
between 1989-91 and 2005-08 for low-income individuals; panel (b) likewise for higher-
income individuals. Table 2.4 presents results from statistical tests of dominance by
income group. For both groups, we find strong evidence that the distribution of dietary
quality in 2005–2008 first-order stochastically dominates the distribution in the earliest
period, with no evidence of a crossing.13
Results support the observation in table 2.2 that a significant portion of dietary
improvement among low-income individuals occurred over the period 2001-08. For
example, in comparing 1989-91 to 1994-96 we find no evidence of a partial ordering
according to the bootstrap results, and the two-stage test confirms this by finding sig-
nificant evidence of a crossing. In comparing 1989-91 to 2001-04, again the bootstrap
results are silent on the ordering, as is the asymptotic test, indicating no dominance at
orders 1 or 2. However, in comparing the most recent time period 2005-08 to any of the
earlier distributions, all tests show a statistically significant, first-order, improvement
in dietary quality, with no evidence of a crossing.
Comparing distributions among higher-income individuals, we can see that 1989-91 is
first-order dominated by each subsequent period with no evidence a crossing. Comparing
1994-96 to 2001-04, the bootstrap results indicate a weak rejection of H−s , which could
lead one to infer a partial ordering. However, when consulting the asymptotic two-stage
test, we find significant evidence of a crossing, thereby ruling out first-order dominance.
We do see that 2005-08 FOSD 1994-96, but we cannot rank the two most recent time
periods.
12As pointed out by a referee, the health-education gradient is also of considerable interest. Although
our main focus here is on income, we present dominance results by education in the supplementary
appendix online for interested readers.
13As a sensitivity check, we also considered poverty thresholds of 75 to 250% of the Federal Poverty
Guidelines in 25% increments. In all cases, both the low- and higher-income group, as defined by the
various thresholds, exhibited a first-order dietary improvement over the 20 year period at less than
5-percent significance levels.
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of adult HEI-2005 scores by income group
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(b) Higher-income
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Notes: Confidence intervals are calculated pointwise by bootstrapping. See online appendix for this
figure in color.
We can compare the total twenty year improvements in each income group by ex-
amining sub-panels (a) and (b) in figure 2.3. We see that low-income individuals ex-
perienced relatively smaller increases over the bottom tail of relevant range of HEI as
compared to their higher-income counterparts. We can more formally investigate this
finding by taking the difference (between above and below 185% of the poverty line)
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Table 2.4: Tests of Stochastic Dominance among U.S. Adults by Income Group
Distribution Bootstrap Tests Two-stage Inferred
A B pˆ−1 pˆ
−
2 pˆ
+
1 pˆ
+
2 p
2S
1,0.1 p
2S
1,0.01 Ranking
Low-income
1989-91 1994-96 0.218 0.257 0.570 0.654 0.027 0.009 ND
2001-04 0.290 0.140 0.977 0.952 0.927 0.878 ND
2005-08 0.008 0.000 1.000 0.882 0.998 0.996 A ≺1 B∗∗∗
1994-96 2001-04 0.332 0.300 0.575 0.889 0.034 0.012 ND
2005-08 0.006 0.003 0.991 0.855 0.984 0.971 A ≺1 B∗∗∗
2001-04 2005-08 0.031 0.033 0.997 0.818 0.998 0.996 A ≺1 B∗∗
Higher-income
1989-91 1994-96 0.007 0.006 0.880 0.684 0.429 0.289 A ≺1 B∗∗∗
2001-04 0.004 0.000 0.999 0.897 0.999 0.999 A ≺1 B∗∗∗
2005-08 0.002 0.000 1.000 0.906 0.985 0.973 A ≺1 B∗∗∗
1994-96 2001-04 0.083 0.106 0.553 0.932 0.032 0.011 ND
2005-08 0.007 0.010 0.991 0.886 0.957 0.926 A ≺1 B∗∗∗
2001-04 2005-08 0.135 0.137 0.913 0.697 0.555 0.410 ND
Notes: The pˆ±s values refer to one-sided tests of the null hypothesis H
±
s using equation (2.7).
The asymptotic p2S1,α values are calculated from (2.8), where α = 0.1, 0.01. The notation
A ≺s B reads “Distribution B dominates distribution A at order s,” while ND indicates
no dominance at order 1 or 2. Inferred ranking is based on statistical significance levels of
∗∗∗1, ∗∗5, and ∗10%.
in the differences (between the earlier and later periods). Figure 2.4 superimposes the
subfigures in panels (a) and (b) of figure 2.3 in the top panel and then plots the differ-
ence between the two in the bottom panel. That is, in the subpanel of figure 2.4 we
plot:
DD =
[
Dˆ1high,89(z)− Dˆ1high,08(z)
]
−
[
Dˆ1low,89(z)− Dˆ1low,08(z)
]
.
As shown in figure 2.4, considering lower levels of dietary quality below a HEI of
45 we find higher-income individuals experienced a greater improvement over 1989–
2008 than low-income individuals. Whereas at higher levels of the HEI distribution,
low-income individuals experienced greater increases in dietary quality. In other words,
we find some evidence that within the poor dietary quality population, low-income
individuals experienced less improvement over the 20-year period as compared to the
higher-income individuals.
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Figure 2.4: Differences in dietary improvements amongst low- and higher-income pop-
ulations
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Notes: Confidence intervals are calculated pointwise by bootstrapping. See online appendix for this
figure in color.
2.5.3 Rate and Location of Change
Given the differential gains in dietary quality noted above, we now investigate when in
time and where in the distribution of dietary quality these improvements took place.
For consistency and cross-sample/population comparisons, we focus on fixed portions
of the distribution of dietary quality. An obvious choice is to use quartiles, which are
all roughly segmented by HEI scores of 40, 50, 60.14 Table 2.5 measures the amount
of dietary improvement occurring in a particular quartile between two time periods as
the percentage of total improvement (Fˆ1989−91 - Fˆ2005−08). That is, we measure the
area bounded by the two empirical CDFs within each quartile range of the HEI scores.
For example, the percentage of improvement in the U.S. over the 20-year period that
occurred in the bottom quartile (< 40) between 1989-91 and 1994-96 was 2.8 percent.
14Quartile estimates for the U.S., low-, and higher-income populations when samples are pooled
across the 20-year period reveal cutoffs of (40.4, 50.7, 61.6), (39.0, 48.8, 60.0), and (40.9, 51.4, 62.2),
respectively.
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The last column of table 2.5 measures the overall improvements over 1989–2008 within
each quartile of the distribution of dietary quality.
Table 2.5: Location and Time-path of Dietary Improvement
Between period Total
HEI range Fˆ89 − Fˆ94 Fˆ94 − Fˆ01 Fˆ01 − Fˆ08 Fˆ89 − Fˆ08
All adults
0 - 40 2.80 12.61 6.21 21.64
40 - 50 5.65 6.83 9.54 22.01
50 - 60 12.41 1.86 10.25 24.52
60 - 100 20.38 -3.64 15.10 31.83
0 - 100 41.23 17.66 41.09 100.00
Low-income
0 - 40 2.70 8.49 8.33 19.41
40 - 50 -1.91 6.99 14.73 19.85
50 - 60 4.40 0.81 20.57 25.80
60 - 100 11.35 -4.18 27.84 34.94
0 - 100 16.54 12.11 71.47 100.00
Higher-income
0 - 40 2.98 15.14 4.49 22.70
40 - 50 8.58 8.46 6.04 23.07
50 - 60 15.24 4.36 4.40 24.00
60 - 100 23.27 -0.99 7.92 30.23
0 - 100 50.07 26.97 22.85 100.00
Note: Numbers represent the percentage of the 20-year improvement coming
from the area bounded by the HEI range and the two distributions.
Fˆ89 = Fˆ1989−91, Fˆ94 = Fˆ1994−96, Fˆ01 = Fˆ2001−04 and Fˆ08 = Fˆ2005−08.
For the U.S. adult population, improvements below the median (HEI < 50) occurred
steadily over the period 1989–2008. Individuals in the upper range of dietary quality
(HEI above 50) experienced virtually all of their gains over the periods 1989–1996 and
2001–2008. Overall, there were slightly higher gains in the upper quartiles compared to
the lower quartiles for the U.S. population.
Comparing the between period improvements by income group, we see that 71.5%
of the total improvement in the diets of the low-income population occurred more re-
cently over 2001–08. This is in contrast to the higher-income population which saw the
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majority of their improvements occurring over 1989–2001 (77.1%). Improvements in the
lower quartiles for the higher-income population have been relatively steady over the
20-year period, whereas most of the improvement in low-income diets within the lower
quartiles occurred more recently over 1994-2008. In other words, at the lower end of the
distribution of dietary quality, low-income individuals have seen comparatively limited
or lagging improvements.
Table 2.5 emphasizes the reasons for targeting the most vulnerable group at risk of
poor diets – the low-income, low dietary quality population. This is best seen by exam-
ining the last column of table 2.5, which measures the total gains over the 20-year period
within each quartile. The higher-income population has had almost proportional gains
across all levels of HEI, whereas the low-income population has seen less improvement
in the lower quartiles of diet quality.
2.6 Counterfactual Analysis
We now explore whether factors that evolve gradually over time within the population
can help explain observed improvements in the distribution of HEI scores between 1989–
2008. We focus on two factors in particular: changes in food formulation and changes in
the demographic landscape.15 In the figures below, we focus on the differences between
the observed 2005-08 distribution and the 1989-91 counterfactual distributions.
2.6.1 Food Reformulation
The composition of the food supply has changed considerably over the last twenty
years in response to changes in policy, regulation, technology and consumer tastes. For
example, Vesper et al. (2012) find that levels of transfats in the population declined after
new labeling requirements were put in place in 2003. We now investigate how much of
the improvement in dietary quality can be attributed to changes in food composition.
In order to identify foods and food mixtures that have undergone food reformulation
(e.g., changes in the type of fat used in processed foods), we use the USDA Food and Nu-
trient Database for Dietary Studies (FNDDS). FNDDS consists of a series of databases
15Educational attainment is missing for 121 individuals in 1989-91 CSFII (61 low-income and 60
higher-income) and 1 higher-income person in 2005-08. These individuals are dropped from all coun-
terfactual analyses. The preceding analysis is robust to their exclusion.
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updated every two years in conjunction with the continuous waves of NHANES to re-
flect the current state of food formulation and packaging. All together we combine the
FNDDS to cover 1994–2008. We briefly explain the method here with more details in
the supplementary appendix online.
To construct the distribution of dietary quality in 1989–1991 as if food were formu-
lated in 2005–2008, we first identify all foods coded as reformulated in the 1994–2008
FNDDS. We then replace the nutrient values for these food items in the 1989–1991
CSFII with the reformulated values found in the FDNNS. We also replace the MPED
values of the 1989–91 reformulated foods with their 2005–08 values. We then construct
a new HEI-2005 score based on updated nutrient and MPED values for each respon-
dent in the 1989–1991 sample. Figure 2.5 displays the results from the reformulation
counterfactual, as well as results from the next section.
Figure 2.5: Differences between the 1989-91 counterfactual distributions and observed
2005-08 distribution
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Note: “Reformulation” is defined in the subsection Food Reformulation. ψh is a reweighting function (see
subsection Demographic Changes) which includes dummies for female and race/ethnicity fully interacted
with age groups, and ψh,e additionally includes education dummies, all as defined in table 2.6.
The distribution of HEI that accounts for reformulation lies everywhere to the right
of the original 1989–1991 distribution over the relevant range of the HEI. The impli-
cation is that, holding food choices constant, changes in food composition could be a
contributing factor to dietary improvement. In figure 2.5, the indicated shaded area
represents the change in the empirical CDFs attributed to reformulation. The ratio of
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this area to the total area provides a scalar measure of change. Here, improvements at-
tributed to reformulation represent about 10.1% of the total difference between 1989–91
and 2005–08.
An important caveat is that this exercise captures partial equilibrium effects and
some care must be taken interpreting these results. Our counterfactual analysis cannot
account for the fact that individuals in 1989–1991 might have chosen different foods had
their foods been formulated as they were in 2005–2008. Nevertheless, it shows how food
reformulation, all else equal, can play an important role in changing dietary quality.
2.6.2 Demographic Changes
The United States of 2005–2008 is an older, more diverse, and better educated country
than the United States of 1989–1991. To the extent that these factors are correlated with
healthy eating, they may explain some of the improvements in dietary quality. Table 2.6
illustrates demographic changes using data from our sample and from the U.S. Census.
There is a clear decrease in the 30 to 44 year old population and a concomitant rise in
the 45 to 64 year cohort. The decrease in the non-hispanic white population has come
from an increase in the Hispanic and other race/ethnicity groups. Finally, the overall
educational attainment in the population has also increased.
To investigate the effect of evolving population characteristics, we construct counter-
factual distributions of HEI scores following an approach proposed by DiNardo, Fortin,
and Lemieux (DFL 1996). We ask, “What would the distribution of HEI scores look
like had the demographic landscape of 2005–08 prevailed in 1989–91?” We focus on age,
race/ethnicity, and educational attainment, all of which have been found to be corre-
lated with diet healthfulness (Popkin, Siega-Riz and Haines, 1996). The intuition is to
adjust each individual’s sampling weight in the base period 1989-91 conditional on a set
of demographics such that it captures the relative probability that the individual would
be represented in the more recent 2005–08 sample.
To briefly describe the DFL methodology, let each individual observation be a vector
(y, h, t), where y is HEI, h is vector of demographic characteristics, and t is time. Thus,
all individuals belong to the joint distribution F (y, h, t). The static joint distribution
of HEI and demographics in time t is F (y, h|t). The density of HEI at any point in
time ft(y) can be written as the integral of the HEI density conditional on a set of
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Table 2.6: U.S. Population Characteristics, Adults 20 and Older
1989-91 2005-08 1990 2005-07
Demographic CSFII NHANES Censusa Censusb
Age 20− 29 21.7 19.4 22.7 19.1
Age 30− 44 35.9 28.3 33.5 29.1
Age 45− 64 26.2 35.4 26.1 35.0
Age 65+ 16.3 16.8 17.6 16.8
Non-Hispanic white 78.8 71.9 78.4 69.5
Non-Hispanic black 10.8 11.3 10.6 11.3
Hispanic 7.7 11.6 7.6 12.8
Other race/ethnicity 2.7 5.2 3.4 6.4
Did not attend high school 8.5 6.0 9.6 6.1
High school, no college 46.2 37.8 44.5 39.7
Attended college 45.2 56.2 45.9 54.2
N 9,377 9,257
aU.S. Census Bureau, General Population Characteristics (CP-1, 3-4).
bU.S. Census Bureau, 2005-07 Annual Community Survey 3-year sample.
demographics f(y|h, ty) at a specific date ty, over the distribution of demographics
F (h|th) at date th
ft(y) =
∫
h∈Ωh
dF (y, h|ty,h = t)
=
∫
h∈Ωh
f(y|h, ty = t)dF (h|th = t)
= f(y; ty = t, th = t)
where Ωh is the domain of individual demographics. Therefore, our question posed
earlier can be written with the above notation as the density of HEI scores in 1989-91
had the 2005-08 demographic landscape prevailed: f(y; ty = 89, th = 08). This density
is written as
f(y; ty = 89, th = 08) =
∫
f(y|h, ty = 89)dF (h|th = 08)
=
∫
f(y|h, ty = 89)ψ(h)dF (h|th = 89)
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where ψ(h) is a reweighting function defined as ψ(h) = dF (h|th = 08)/dF (h|th = 89).
Applying Bayes’ rule to the function we can rewrite ψ(h) as
ψ(h) =
Pr(th = 08|h)
Pr(th = 89|h) ·
Pr(th = 89)
Pr(th = 08)
.
To obtain an estimate ψˆ(h), notice the conditional probabilities Pr(th = t|h) can
be estimated using a probit model by pooling the data and estimating the probability
an individual is observed in time t conditional on a set of characteristics. As we only
compare two dates, the unconditional probabilities Pr(th = t) are simply the weighted
sums of individuals in period th over the weighted sums of individuals in both periods.
Because we are interested in applying the above methodology to tests of stochastic
dominance, we replace an individual’s sampling weight θi with ωi = θiψˆi(h) in equation
(2.2).
While long run demographic changes such as gender, age and race/ethnicity are
plausibly exogenous, the claim that education is uncorrelated with omitted factors that
affect diet quality is less plausible. However, we are interested in how changes in the
distribution of education affects changes in diet quality, rather than how education
affects diet quality. In other words, the conditional independence assumption E[ε|h] =
0 is unnecessary for our decompositional analysis. Rather, we only need the weaker
assumption of ignorability (also called unconfoundedness or selection on observables) to
compute the aggregate compositional effects of all demographics. Ignorability asserts
that the correlation between education (or any variable in h) and the error term is the
same in both periods.16
Due to the aggregate decompositional nature of DFL (as opposed to a Oaxaca-style
decomposition), the reweighting function ψ(h) does not distinguish between individual
variables in the vector h. In the interests of transparency, we construct the counter-
factual distributions in two stages: First, we construct a counterfactual distribution
accounting for purely demographic changes (gender, age and race/ethnicity) and de-
note this reweighting function by ψh. We then construct a counterfactual distribution
16If we believe this assumption does not hold, then we can sign the bias. For example, if we believe
that more highly educated individuals use their stock of knowledge more efficiently in 2005-08 than in
1989-91, then we have a positive bias. However, there is no a priori evidence to suggest a change in the
correlation of education and the error term, let alone as to its direction.
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accounting for changes in demographics and changes in education levels, denoted by
ψh,e.
17 We investigate the effects of the ordering in section 2.6.4.
Figure 2.5 decomposes the change in the distribution of HEI into four main parts:
improvements attributed to reformulation (as shown in the previous section), additional
improvements attributed to changes in demographics – with and without education –
and finally the residual change. As noted above, 10.1% of total improvement can be
attributed to changes in food composition. Here we find that roughly equal proportions
of the total improvement in HEI scores can be attributed to changes in gender, age
and race/ethnicity (26.6%) and education (26.7%) over the twenty year period.18 This
leaves 36.6% of the improvement unexplained by reformulation and demographics (i.e.,
the residual improvement). The residual improvement encompasses many competing
factors such as changes in tastes, relative food prices, scientific discovery, and attitudes
towards food in general.
As above, care must be taken in interpreting these results. One important limitation
of the partial equilibrium nature of the counterfactual analysis is that food choices
in the counterfactual population would not affect the set of foods made available by
food manufacturers. While this assumption is economically unappealing, the exercise
provides insight into the effects of changing demographics on diet quality via clear and
tractable analytical techniques.
2.6.3 Counterfactuals by Income Group
The counterfactual analyses above suggest that an important part of the improvement
in dietary quality can be attributed to changes in food composition and demographics.
Given that improvements occurred at different rates for different parts of the HEI distri-
bution for lower-income versus higher-income individuals, we now ask whether changes
in food composition and demographics account for differing amounts of improvement
by income group. Results are presented in figure 2.6.
Changes in food composition account for a substantially larger percentage of the
17The conditional probability model includes a dummy for gender, 16 cells of race/ethnicity fully
interacted with age dummies, and three education dummies, all as described in table 2.6. Results of
the model available available in the supplementary appendix online.
18See the supplementary appendix online for dominance results between each counterfactual distri-
bution and the observed 2005-08 distribution.
32
Figure 2.6: Differences between the 1989-91 counterfactual distributions and observed
2005-08 distribution by income group
Reformulation
!h
!h,e
Residual
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
D
iff
er
en
ce
0 20 40 60 80 100
Low-Income
Reformulation
!h
!h,e
Residual
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
D
iff
er
en
ce
0 20 40 60 80 100
Healthy Eating Index
Higher-Income
Note: “Reformulation” is defined in the subsection Food Reformulation. ψh is a reweighting function (see
subsection Demographic Changes) which includes dummies for female and race/ethnicity fully interacted
with age groups, and ψh,e additionally includes education dummies, all as defined in table 2.6.
dietary improvement for lower-income individuals (19.6%) as compared to their higher-
income counterparts (6.4%). This is consistent with the observation that low-income
individuals eat more processed foods (Drewnowski and Barratt-Fornell, 2004), where
much of the reformulation is occurring. Changes in gender, age and race/ethnicity ac-
count for a similar share of the improvement for low-income (25.3%) than higher-income
individuals (26.8%). For low-income individuals, changes in educational attainment ac-
count for half that of higher-income (13.5% versus 27.0%). The remaining residual share
of the twenty-year improvement is larger within the low-income population (41.6%) as
compared to higher-income (39.8%). This suggests that further research into the deter-
minants of diet quality of low-income individuals may be warranted.
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2.6.4 Robustness
The order in which we construct counterfactual distributions using the DFL approach
can influence the results. To investigate the robustness of our findings to ordering,
we estimate the model using an alternative ordering for each of the three population
groups of interest (total population, low-income, higher-income). Note that because
reformulation is not estimated, but rather derived from data, it does not matter which
order it is considered. Furthermore, the total aggregate effect (ψh,e) remains the same
as well. For example, in either case all demographics account for 53.3% of the total
improvement within the U.S. population.
Table 2.7 provides estimates for the original order as presented above, as well as an
alternative ordering where we first consider educational attainment ψe and then use ψh,e
as before. The result places bounds on the magnitude for each set of demographics. For
example, the effect of education ranges between 15.6 and 26.7% for the total population,
5.0 and 13.5% for the low-income group and 16.0 and 27.0% for the higher income group.
Although point estimates change, relative comparisons remain substantively the same
– changes in education appear to account for a larger share of the improvement for the
higher-income group relative to the lower-income group. We note that the bounds are
relatively large and credibly point-identifying each effect remains a task for future work.
Table 2.7: DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux Counterfactual Improvements
Order: U.S. Population Low-income Higher-income
Original Order
1. Reformulation 10.1 19.6 6.4
2. Gender, Age, Race/Ethnicity 26.6 25.3 26.8
3. Education 26.7 13.5 27.0
Total: Reformulation & Demos 63.4 58.4 60.2
Alternative Order
1. Reformulation 10.1 19.6 6.4
2. Education 15.6 5.0 16.0
3. Gender, Age, Race/Ethnicity 37.7 33.7 37.7
Total: Reformulation & Demos 63.4 58.4 60.2
Note: Numbers represent the percentage of total improvement and may not sum accordingly
due to rounding.
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2.7 Discussion and Conclusion
Conventional wisdom maintains that the quality of the American diet has been dete-
riorating for at least the past two decades.19 In contrast, we document a previously
unknown pattern of improvement in U.S. dietary quality. We find statistically signif-
icant improvements for all adults over the period 1989–2008, at all levels of dietary
quality.
An important caveat is that the HEI measures diet quality on a per calorie basis and
does not account for excess calorie consumption. To our the best of our knowledge, few
studies have examined the quantity-quality isoquant of food in health production, and
those that have generally do so within the context of specific foods, in an experimental
framework. In a series of dietary intervention experiments, Epstein et al. (2001, 2008)
found that increasing healthy food consumption reduced obesity to a greater degree than
reducing unhealthy food consumption. Moreover, in Epstein et al. (2008) individuals in
the increase-healthy-food group showed no relapse in weight gain in a two year follow up.
The implication is that a shift towards a healthier diet could have additional positive
impacts on health outcomes driven by quantity, such as obesity. The mechanism is
generally thought to be a higher level of satiation, which in turn leads to a reduction in
overall calories consumed.
While we find that higher-income individuals consistently have higher dietary quality
than low-income individuals, we also find some evidence that the gap is shrinking over
the sample period. An important caution is that the diets of low-income individuals in
the lowest portion of the diet quality distribution continue to lag.
We also show that most of the improvement in dietary quality can be attributed to
changes in food formulation and changes in demographics. Moreover, we find that
changes in food formulation help explain considerably more of the improvement in
dietary quality for low-income individuals than for higher-income individuals. These
findings suggest that the direct and indirect effects of policy on food composition may
represent understudied policy levers. How large are these results? In a prospective
study that roughly covers our sample period, Chiuve et al. (2012) found significantly
lower risks of major chronic diseases across the entire distribution of HEI-2005 scores for
19See for example Gregory, Smith and Wendt (2011).
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both women (over 1984-2008) and men (1986-2008) who were free of chronic disease at
baseline. For example, those in the second quintile were 7 percent less likely of chronic
disease incidence than those in the lowest quintile, all else equal. One way to asses the
magnitude of changes in HEI over time is to see how many individuals move from low
to moderate levels of dietary quality over the period under study. In 1989-91, the 20th
percentile of the HEI distribution was 37.3. In 2005-08, a HEI value of 37.3 represented
the 15.4th percentile of the HEI distribution. In other words 4.6 percent of individuals
moved out of this higher-risk category between 1989–2008 due to improvements in diet
quality.
Findings of a small but statistically significant increase in dietary quality should not
overshadow the fact that there is still considerable room for improvement. Moreover,
an important residual share of the change in dietary quality over the period remains
unexplained, especially in the tails of the distributions. Because of the sheer number of
overlapping and time varying policy initiatives – particularly those that target the poor
– credibly identifying effects of specific policies remains a challenging task for future
work.
Chapter 3
“Billions and Billions Served”
Heterogeneous Effects of School
Food and Away Food on Child
Dietary Quality
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3.1 Introduction
Early decisions in human capital accumulation and skill formation have direct conse-
quences on the productivity of future investments (Cunha et al., 2006). Skills related
to health capital, for example, quickly accumulate early on in life and have persistent
impacts throughout adolescence and adulthood (McFadden, 2008). Therefore, it is of
no surprise that the case for investing early in children, specifically the disadvantaged, is
strong (Heckman and Masterov, 2007), and policymakers are particularly interested in
programs that target such children. With nutrition in mind, two longstanding Federal
programs have gained increasing attention in the United States: the School Breakfast
Program (SBP) and the National School Lunch Program (NSLP).1
Offered in over 100,000 public and non-profit institutions, the SBP and NSLP serve
millions of students every school day.2 Together, these two Federally subsidized meal
programs represent a substantial and repeated exposure to nutrition skill formation,
which has strong implications for nutrition capital accumulation. For example, nu-
merous experimental trials have demonstrated that infants and young children have the
capability to learn and apply nutrition skills, but the ability to adopt new skills decreases
as one matures into adulthood.3 Outside of school and home, exposure to food-away-
from-home (FAFH), such as fast-food and restaurant establishments, has become much
more prominent in the daily diet of American children (Poti and Popkin, 2011). While
the literature generally agrees that FAFH negatively impacts health, researchers are at
odds with respect to the impact of school food. The findings of this paper suggest that
the conflicting results may be due to a focus on the average effect of consuming school
food, which may mask important effects in the tails of the outcome distribution.
This study adds to the current literature by considering heterogeneous effects of food
source across all levels of underlying dietary quality, rather than focusing on average
diet quality. I focus on dietary quality because it correlates with body weight (Jennings
1Since its inception in 1946, the NSLP has served over 224 billion lunches in the U.S. (FNS-USDA,
2012a). Interestingly, it is estimated that McDonald’s has sold over 247 billion hamburgers since its
re-opening under its namesake in 1948.
2The NSLP is offered in 99% of all public schools and 94% of public and private schools combined
(Ralston et al., 2008). Nearly 32 million lunches were served daily in 2011, with roughly two-thirds at
a free or reduced-price (FNS-USDA, 2012a). The SBP served 12.1 million students in 2011, with 10.1
million receiving a free or reduced-priced breakfast (FNS-USDA, 2012b).
3Benton (2004) and Birch (1999) provide thorough reviews of such studies.
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et al., 2011) and academic achievement (Florence, Asbridge and Veugelers, 2008) in
children, is a predictor for many chronic diseases in adulthood (Chiuve et al., 2013) and
is at the forefront of Federal and State policies aimed at reforming nutritional standards
in schools.
Three food sources are considered: food from home (FFH), from away from home
(FAFH) and food from school (FFS). I define underlying dietary quality as a child’s
“proneness” to consume a healthful diet.4 For example, a child who is prone to a very
low quality diet, possibly due to parental or environmental factors, may exhibit large
benefits from a school lunch and/or breakfast. On the other hand, a child prone to
a high quality diet who consumes a meal from school may experience a decrease in
overall dietary quality. Therefore, examining the the average treatment effect (ATE) of
participating in school food programs may mask important heterogeneous effects. This
study expands on existing literature by estimating the quantile treatment effect (QTE)
of food source on the distribution of child dietary quality.
Several studies have investigated the mean effects of food source on various aspects
of child health. Many have found that FAFH increases calorie intake (Bowman et al.,
2004; Powell and Nguyen, 2013) and reduces diet quality among children (Mancino et al.,
2010). When examining the effect of participating in the SBP and the NSLP separately,
several authors are in agreement that the former is beneficial (Bhattacharya, Currie
and Haider, 2006; Millmet and Tchernis, 2012; Millimet, Tchernis and Husain, 2010;
Schanzenbach, 2009) but the latter is not (Schanzenbach, 2009; Millimet et al., 2010).
For example, Schanzenbach (2009) found that school lunches increased average daily
calorie intake by about 40 kilocalories and that children who consume school lunches
have higher rates of obesity by 1 to 2%. Overall, while the consensus appears to be that
child health is negatively impacted by FAFH, researchers are at odds when considering
the average impact of a school breakfast or lunch.
Several approaches to identifying the effect of food source on dietary outcomes have
been used. A fixed effect, or first-differencing approach, is easily implemented by using
two days of dietary intake typically found in U.S. nationally representative data sets
4The term “proneness” was introduced by Doksum (1974). In the present study, proneness can be
thought of as the (fixed) degree to which one consumes a healthful diet. Perhaps a more relatable
example from the economics literature is ability, which is defined by how prone one is to more favorable
labor market outcomes.
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(e.g., Mancino et al., 2010; Powell and Nguyen, 2013). When examining more long-
term outcomes, such as body weight, an individual fixed effect approach becomes more
problematic (e.g., Schanzenbach, 2009). A second approach is to use instrumental
variables (Hinrichs, 2010), which comes with limitations such as the exclusion restriction
and access to a credible instrument.5 Gundersen, Kreider and Pepper (2012) step
back from identification and place bounds on the effect of participating in the free and
reduced price lunch program. The bounding approach relies on the weaker monotone
instrumental variable (MIV) assumption.6 Bhattacharya, Currie and Haider (2006) use
variation in the timing of the interview (i.e., if school is in session or not) coupled
with SBP availability via difference-in-differences. Finally, Schanzenbach (2009) uses
regression discontinuity, which has assumptions similar in spirit to the MIV assumption.
A drawback of regression discontinuity is that the effects are estimated only for those
near the income eligibility cutoff, again, possibly masking any heterogeneous effects.
All of the aforementioned studies examined average effects. A major limitation of
this approach is that it is not very informative about effects in the tails of the outcome
distribution. This paper uses a quantile regression technique to determine the effect of
food source on dietary quality across the entire distribution. Where this study differs
methodologically from those previously published is the identification procedure for
examining distributional effects. Identification is accomplished by using within-person
variation of dietary intake on two nonconsecutive days but maintains the nonseparable
property of the disturbance term, also called the rank variable. In other words, rank is
determined by “total proneness,” which is function of both the individual fixed effect
and random error. This advancement allows the coefficients of interest to be interpreted
in the same manner as cross-sectional quantile estimation. Contrast this with location-
shift quantile estimators that model the individual fixed effect as a separate additive
term (Canay, 2011; Galvao Jr., 2011; Graham et al., 2009; Lamarche, 2010; Ponomareva,
2011). By separating the total disturbance, the coefficient of interest is now interpreted
as the effect relative to one’s on fixed effect, which is not very informative from a policy
5See Millmet and Tchernis, (2012) for an application to the SBP using alternative assumptions to
estimate treatment effects without the exclusion restriction.
6The MIV assumption relaxes the exclusion restriction (see, Manski and Pepper, 2000). Gundersen
et al. (2012) assume participation in the free or reduced price programs is monotonically associated
with income to overcome selection into free or reduced-price programs. They find receipt of free or
reduced-price lunches improves child health outcomes.
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standpoint.
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section more formally defines dietary quality
and introduces a widely used measurement, the Healthy Eating Index-2005, which forms
the basis of the analysis. After a brief overview of the data, I use summary measures
to motivate a more detailed analysis. I then discuss the identification and estimation
strategy, followed by the main results. The final section discusses policy implications
and conclusions.
3.2 Dietary Quality
The overall healthfulness of a child’s diet can be distinguished by two factors: energy
balance and dietary quality. Energy balance is relationship between calories consumed
and calories expended, which results in body weight management (Hall et al., 2012).
Dietary quality, on the other hand, represents the degree to which a child’s diet is
meeting a set of criteria, for example, eating the correct proportions of healthy foods
while maintaining moderation in less-healthy foods. It is important to note that energy
balance and dietary quality are interconnected: experimental studies have shown when
children switch to higher-quality diets, as opposed to calorie-restriction diets, sustained
weight control is observed (Epstein et al. 2001, 2008).
I quantify dietary quality using the Healthy Eating Index (HEI). The HEI was devel-
oped in 1995 to measure compliance to the U.S. Government’s official recommendations
for healthful eating, the Dietary Guidelines for Americans (DGA). Every five years,
based on an expert advisory panel, the DGA are revised by the U.S. Departments of
Agriculture (USDA) and Health and Human Services (HHS). As such, the HEI has been
updated several times to reflect the most current state of nutrition knowledge. This pa-
per uses the HEI-2005 and will henceforth refer to the HEI-2005 as simply HEI.7
The HEI is the sum of 12 components based on the consumption of various foods or
nutrients. Each component assigns a score ranging from 0 to 5 (total fruit, whole fruit,
total vegetables, dark green/orange vegetables and legumes, total grains, whole grains),
0 to 10 (milk, meats and beans, oils, saturated fat, sodium) or 0 to 20 for the percentage
7Future work will use the HEI-2010. Note that the two have many similarities (see, National Cancer
Institute, 2013).
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of calories from solid fats, alcoholic beverages, and added sugars (SoFAAS) creating a
maximum score of 100. Appendix table C.1 provides exact details of the scoring (see
also, Guenther et al., 2008a).
The HEI has been widely used and evaluated as a valid measure of diet quality
(Guenther et al., 2008b). In the medical literature, lower HEI scores are associated
with higher risks of coronary heart disease, stroke and diabetes (Chuive et al., 2012),
cardiovascular disease (Nicklas et al., 2012), breast cancer (Shahril, 2012), colorectal
cancer (Reedy et al., 2008) and prostate cancer (Bosire et al., 2013). Economists have
used the HEI as an indicator of well-being to analyze distributional trends (Beatty, Lin
and Smith, 2014) and to study the impacts of the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance
Program (Gregory et al., 2013). It is important to reiterate that the HEI is a per-
calorie measure of dietary quality and does not directly consider excessive calorie intake.
Although at first glance this distinction may seem limiting, it is important and necessary
to analyze the relative quality of foods consumed across various food sources.8
3.3 Data
I use data from three waves of the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey
(NHANES) covering 2003-08. Each survey wave is an independently drawn sample,
which is representative of the U.S. with the USDA overseeing the food intake component.
The NHANES provides rich information on dietary intakes so that HEI scores can be
calculated according to Guenther et al. (2008a) (see also, the Appendix table C.1).
Each wave was conducted from November in the odd year to October in the even
year. For the 2003-08 NHANES, respondents report 24-hour dietary intakes on two
nonconsecutive days (Day 1 and Day 2). Day 1 intakes are administered in-person
during the medical exam, and Day 2 intakes are conducted 3–10 days later in a follow-
up telephone interview. All interviews are conducted by trained dietary interviewers
with the aid of three-dimensional measuring instruments.
A primary goal of this research is to understand how school food affects dietary
8It is also worth noting that analyzing energy balance is problematic for several reasons: (a) quan-
tifying energy expenditure is difficult (Crouter, Clowers, and Bassett, 2005); (b) calorie needs vary
substantially for boys and girls of different ages, making distributional comparisons within the popula-
tion difficult; (c) most importantly, calorie consumption is not monotonic; one would need to make an
assumption about the asymmetric relationship between under- and over-calorie consumption.
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quality. As such, I focus on school-aged children (4–19) that report attending kinder-
garten through high school during the school year and have complete dietary intakes on
both days (n = 7, 009). Thus, children that have dropped out of school or graduated
are excluded. I also exclude those attending schools that do not offer a lunch (n = 379),
as done elsewhere in the literature (Gleason and Suitor, 2003; Gunderson et al., 2012;
Millmet et al., 2000; Schanzenbach, 2009). The final sample with complete information
consists of 6, 630 children.
Broadly defined, food from home (FFH) are items bought at the grocery store, food
from school (FFS) are meals received at school, and food away from home (FAFH)
primarily consists of fast-food and full-service restaurant items. Also included in FAFH
are items bought in vending machines, received as a gift, and street food. Thus, for
example, a candy bar purchased from a vending machine at school is considered FAFH,
not FFS. Appendix B.2 contains complete details for mapping the 25 original food
source codes into one of the three categories.
3.4 Summary Measures
In specifying regression models, I will use home-prepared food (FFH) as the reference
category. This will give FFH a control interpretation, which is reasonable since children
in the U.S. eat at home nearly every day (table 3.1). FFS and FAFH will be considered
the policy variables of interest (i.e., treatments). Food served in schools and at away-
from-home venues are sources of political debate and subject to policy interventions.9
Variation in FFS and FAFH is considerable as evidenced by table 3.1. Roughly 40% of
children ate at school on at least one day in 2003-08, and over three-quarters of children
reported FAFH consumption on Day 1, Day 2 or both.
By design, and as noted earlier, HEI scores are bounded between 0 and 100. In
table 3.2 we can see that no child is observed on the bounds. In fact, dietary scores for
both Day 1 and Day 2 are approximately normally distributed with a central tendency
9For example, the NSLP has undergone numerous regulatory changes with respect to minimal nu-
tritional values (see Ralston et al., 2008). The most recent change to nutritional standards for the
SBP and NSLP begin to take affect in the 2013 school year under the Healthy Hunger-Free Kids Act
of 2010 (Code of Federal Regulations, Title 7, Parts 210 and 220, 2013). In fast-food and restaurant
establishments, nutritional facts are now mandatory. Moreover, some states, such as New York, are
currently seeking to further regulate away-from-home venues.
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Table 3.1: Variation in consumption by food source
Percentage consuming on...
Food Source Neither day One day only Both days
Home 0.19 2.20 97.61
School 58.72 29.41 11.88
Away 21.65 43.09 35.27
Source: Children aged 4-19 reporting two complete days of intake in the the
2003-08 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES).
The sample includes children that report attending kindergarten through
high school during the school year and attend schools that offer a lunch.
All calculations use survey weights.
of about 50 (see kernel densities in appendix figure B.1). Participation in the away-
from-home market is noticeably lower on Day 2, which is most likely correlated with
the observed shift in intake records towards the beginning of the week (table 3.2).10 The
allocation of calories across the three food sources varies substantially, is skewed towards
100% for home food and skewed towards 0% for school and away food. By conditioning
on participation, we can get a a more complete picture of calorie consumption when
children consume FFS and FAFH. In particular, children consume about one-third of
their calories at school and about 40% of their calories away form home conditional on
participation.
3.4.1 Mean Measures
Table 3.1 suggests using individual variation to estimate the impact of food served in
schools and away from home on dietary quality. By including individual fixed effects
and assuming conditional exogeneity, unobservable fixed characteristics associated with
selection into the SBP and/or NSLP, as well as food-away-from-home market, are no
10Note, however, that the NHANES provide specific two-day dietary sample weights that account for
nonresponse of dietary intake on Day 1 (about 6% of the total sample) and for additional nonresponse
on Day 2 (an additional 10%). The weights also account for the differential allocation by day of the
week and for the proportion of weekend-weekday combinations of Day 1 and Day 2 recalls. Less than
2% of the sample used in this study were surveyed on the same day of the week.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics
Variable Day 1 Day 2
Outcome: HEI-2005
Mean (st. dev.) 49.88 (16.22) 51.62 (16.81)
[min, max] [15.11, 92.24] [11.62, 92.89]
Food source participation (%)
Home 98.62 98.79
School 25.53 27.64
Away 64.05 49.58
Allocation of calories (% of total)a
Home 65.49 (29.21) 72.06 (27.95)
School 8.65 (17.11) 9.16 (17.16)
Away 25.86 (27.71) 18.79 (25.35)
Allocation of calories (% of total),
conditional on participation
Home 66.40 (28.30) 72.94 (26.92)
School 33.89 (17.13) 33.13 (19.47)
Away 40.38 (24.96) 37.90 (22.96)
Day of the week (%)
Sunday 13.56 27.60
Monday 14.69 21.11
Tuesday 12.93 16.28
Wednesday 14.11 15.89
Thursday 13.84 5.08
Friday 14.36 10.08
Saturday 16.51 3.95
Number of children 6,630 6,630
Source: Children aged 4-19 reporting two complete days of intake in the the 2003-08 National
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES). The sample includes children that report
attending kindergarten through high school during the school year and attend schools that offer a
lunch. All calculations use survey weights.
aCalculated as 100× (calories from source k on day t)/(total calorie intake on day t).
longer confounding. This suggests a general OLS specification such as
HEIit = αi +D
′
itβ +X
′
itδ + εit (3.1)
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where HEIit is the measure of diet quality for child i on day t and αi are individual
fixed effects. The term Dit represents the two policy variables of interest – the share of
daily calories consumed at school and away from home. Time-varying controls, such as
dummies for the interview day and each day of the week, are included in Xit. Finally,
εit is an additive disturbance term. The underlying assumption is that changes in Dit
(and Xit) are uncorrelated with changes in εit, so that β is consistently estimated. This
assumption seems reasonable in the current context given that the second survey day
is administered randomly 3–10 days after the first survey day.11
Some care must be taken in defining the policy variable. One approach is to simply
define Dit as a dummy variable that equals one if child i consumed any food from that
particular food source on day t. There are several limitations to this approach. For
example, a child consuming two meals away from home would be categorized in the
same manner as a child consuming one FAFH meal. Moreover, many children multi-
source meals (e.g., consume some FFH and FFS in the same meal). Using lunch as an
example, I find that 22% of lunches are multi-sourced on Day 1. Finally, the nutrient
density (i.e., nutrient per calorie) varies widely depending on where the food was sourced
(Lin and Guthrie, 2012) and should be considered when defining the policy variables.
I consider an alternative definition for the policy variables: the proportion of daily
calorie intake from each food source. Under this definition, I am capturing the extent
to which a child is “exposed” to each food source. Specifically, estimates using this
definition capture the effect of substituting some share of calories from one food source
to another. In short, defining Dit as the share of calories from school and away food
will be my preferred definition, but I report both for comparison.
Column (1) of table 3.3 reports results using equation (3.1) with individual fixed
effects only. Panels A and B report results using the two alternative policy variable
definitions “dummy” and “share,” respectively. Under the dummy variable definition
in panel A, a child that consumes any FFS exhibits an average increase of 1.23 points
on the HEI scale as compared to a child that does not eat at school. Using the average
11Changes in Xit are uncorrelated with changes in εit by survey design. Changes in Dit are orthogonal
to changes in the disturbance term to the extent that changes in any time-varying omitted factors are
uncorrelated with changes in the allocation of calories across the three food sources. More concretely,
since food preferences are assumed to be fixed over the ten-day survey period, we can assume a relatively
small omitted variable problem after conditioning on the individual fixed effect.
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of Day 1 and 2 HEI scores in table 4.1, this equates to an average increase in dietary
quality by 2.4%.
Table 3.3: Mean regressions with individual fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Dummy
School food 1.228∗∗ 1.185∗∗ 0.152 0.099
(0.448) (0.434) (0.583) (0.567)
Away food -2.521∗∗∗ -2.047∗∗∗ -2.111∗∗∗ -1.811∗∗
(0.536) (0.570) (0.593) (0.600)
Panel B: Shares
School food 2.161 2.296 0.187 0.215
(1.459) (1.442) (1.630) (1.624)
Away food -5.617∗∗∗ -4.791∗∗∗ -4.741∗∗∗ -4.237∗∗
(1.192) (1.228) (1.296) (1.290)
Fixed Effects
Individual Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interview day No Yes No Yes
Day of the week No No Yes Yes
Observations 13,260 13,260 13,260 13,260
No. of children 6,630 6,630 6,630 6,630
R2 (Panel A) 0.014 0.022 0.027 0.031
R2 (Panel B) 0.018 0.026 0.030 0.034
Notes: The dependent variable is the HEI-2005. Standard errors are in
parentheses and are calculated accounting for stratification and clustering.
Panel A: Dk = 1 if food source k was consumed on day t and zero otherwise.
Panel B: Dk = share of calories consumed from food source k on day t.
Using the share definition in panel B, it is useful to rescale the coefficients by average
calorie allocation, conditional on participation (table 4.1). For example, since the aver-
age child consumes roughly one-third of their daily calorie intake at school, conditional
on participation, the FFS estimate in column (1) of panel B equates to a 0.72 point in-
crease in HEI (or 1.4%). When children frequent food-away-from-home establishments,
an average of about 40% of daily caloric intake is consumed there. Thus, using estimates
from panel B, one can infer an average decrease in HEI by 2.25 points (or 4.4%) when
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consuming FAFH. In comparing panel A and B, estimates using definition the share
definition tend to be smaller.
Column (2) includes a dummy for the interveiw day (i.e., Day 1 or Day 2). This
variable may be necessary due to differences dietary recall on Day 1 (in-person interview)
versus Day 2 (telephone interview). The estimated coefficient on FFS changes very little,
and the effect of FAFH is less.
Since NHANES surveys individuals on all days of the week, column (3) of table 3.3
includes an additional fixed effect for the day of the week. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
estimates for FFS change dramatically and are no longer significant, most likely because
children do not typically attend schools on the weekend. Conversely, FAFH is more likely
to be consumed on the weekend, and again estimates are slightly smaller as compared
to column (1).
Finally, column (4) reports coefficient estimates with individual fixed effects and
dummies for the interview day and each day of the week fixed effects. This will be the
preferred specification moving forward. In summary, there appears to a positive but
insignificant average impact of school food on dietary quality and a robust, negative
average impact of FAFH on dietary quality.
3.4.2 Distributional Measures
To motivate a distributional analysis, I present summary measures by selected quantiles.
In table 3.4 I compare two-day average HEI scores for those that never select into FFS
or FAFH (column 1 in table 3.1) and those that report consuming FFS or FAFH on at
least one day of intake (columns 2 and 3 in table 3.1).12
We can see that the positive effect of FFS drops as we move across the distribution of
HEI scores, implying much larger positive impacts in the bottom half of the distribution.
The effect of FAFH has the smallest impact at the very bottom of the diet-quality
distribution. This result is most likely due to the presumption that home-prepared food
is more similar to FAFH at low levels of overall dietary quality. Beyond the bottom
quartile, the effect of FAFH is relatively constant and thus more closely reflects the
mean regressions.
12Dividing the sample in this manner is similar to the dummy variable definition used in panel A of
table 3.3.
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Table 3.4: Differences in the distribution of two-day average HEI-2005 scores by food
source
Quantile
Food Source 5 25 50 75 95 N
Food from school
At least one day 36.13 44.27 51.27 58.30 67.72 3,298
Neither day 33.45 42.80 50.25 57.27 68.07 3,332
Difference 2.68 1.47 1.02 1.04 -0.36
Food away from home
At least one day 33.94 42.76 50.02 56.82 66.34 5,163
Neither day 35.19 46.26 53.47 60.78 71.15 1,467
Difference -1.25 -3.50 -3.45 -3.96 -4.81
Note: A Kolmogorov-Smirnov type test of stochastic dominance (Barrett and
Donald, 2003) indicates first-order dominance of FFS (at least one day) over
FFS (neither day) with a simulated p-value of 0.041. Bennett’s (2013) asymptotic
two-stage test, however, indicates the FFS curves cross, leading to the conclusion
of second-order dominance (p = 0.015). FAFH (neither day) first-order dominates
FAFH (at least one day) with a simulated p-value of 0.000.
Of course, results from table 3.4 are confounded by both observable and unobservable
individual characteristics. Moreover, given the results of table 3.3, we should also expect
the day of the week to play an important role in identifying a more causal interpretation.
In the next section, I use an estimator developed in Powell (2014) to estimate quantile
treatment effects while controlling for individual fixed characteristics.
3.5 Quantile Estimation with Individual Fixed Effects
In this paper an important departure from the previous literature is how I estimate and
identify the impact of food source on dietary quality. Given the summary results of
the previous section, it is likely that the impact of food source is heterogenous across
the distribution of diet quality. Much of this heterogeneity is most likely due to both
observable and unobservable individual characteristics.
Typically, panel data can be used to control for individual heterogeneity via fixed
effects. With mean regressions, an additive term αi is included in the specification, and
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the estimated coefficients on the treatment (policy) vector D can be interpreted as the
impact on both the conditional and unconditional mean (see Fripro). With quantile
estimation, an additive fixed effect alters the interpretation of the coefficient of interest.
The intuition behind this result is rather straightforward: the τ th quantile of Yit|Dit, αi
is in most cases not equal to the τ th quantile of Yit|Dit. For example, a high-quantile
child in the distribution of Yit|Dit may become a low-quantile child after conditioning
on his or her individual fixed effect.
The estimator used in this study accounts for individual heterogeneity without spec-
ifying or even estimating an individual “fixed-effect” parameter. Rather, unobservable
individual heterogeneity is incorporated into the model by using within-person varia-
tion for identification but maintains the nonseparable property of the total disturbance
U∗it = f(αi, Uit). This allows the parameter vector β(τ) to be interpreted in the same
manner as the τ th “cross-sectional” quantile treatment effect. If we are interested in
knowing how school and away affects low dietary quality children separately from high
dietary quality children, this is precisely what we want to estimate.
3.5.1 Specification
Consider a cross-sectional quantile regression (QR) specification
Yi = D
′
iβ(U
∗
i ), U
∗
i ∼ U(0, 1) (3.2)
where for child i, Yi is dietary quality, Di is a vector of the proportion of calorie intake
from each food source and U∗i is “total proneness” to consume a healthy diet.
13 Total
proneness is a function of his or her unobservable fixed proneness αi (e.g., food prefer-
ences or environmental factors) and a disturbance term Ui (e.g., day-to-day randomness
of food intake). In other words, U∗i is a rank variable that incorporates heterogeneity
into the model by allowing dietary quality to vary across children that have the same
13One may also desire to include a set of controls Xi, such as gender, age and race/ethnicity. The
addition of “controls” alters the QTE interpretation of the estimates because some of U∗i becomes
observed through Xi. Put differently, if Di = (Xi, D˜i) in equation (3.2) where D˜i are the treatments of
interest, Xi would also be interpreted as a treatment vector, a distinction that is not necessary in mean
regressions. Specifically, estimates in this specification would provide the QTE on the distribution of
Yi|Di, Xi rather than Yi|Di. See Powell (2013) for an in-depth discussion and estimation strategy of
QTE in the presence of covariates.
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observed allocation of calories. It is necessary to assume the relationship between prone-
ness and the outcome to be (weakly) monotonic. That is, children with a higher U∗i are
more prone to a healthier diet for a given allocation of calories across the three food
sources.
Clearly, no cross-sectional distinction can be made between αi and Ui but it is
informative to see that the impact of covariates vary according to the total level of
proneness U∗i . Moreover, an estimate of β using equation (3.2) assumes Di is exogenous.
If we believe individual-level fixed characteristics influence a child’s allocation of calories
across food source, then U∗i |Di  U(0, 1).
To this end, it is useful to write down the Structural Quantile Function (SQF) intro-
duced by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005, 2008). The SQF of interest for identifying
the QTE can be written as
Sy(τ |d) = d′β(τ), τ ∈ (0, 1). (3.3)
Equation (3.3) defines the τ th quantile of the latent outcome Yd = d
′β(U∗) for a fixed
allocation of calories and a randomly selected U∗ ∼ U(0, 1).14 This framework becomes
important for describing the various “fixed-effect” quantile estimators and how they
relate to the structural equation of interest.
Now consider a panel of students that report dietary intakes on multiple days. In
this case, equation (3.2) can be rewritten as
Yit = D
′
itβ(U
∗
it), U
∗
it ∼ U(0, 1) (3.4)
where U∗it = f(αi, Uit). Again, αi is the student’s fixed level of proneness and Uit is
an individual time-varying disturbance term. In this case, conditioning on individual
fixed effects can overcome endogeneity concerns if Uit is uncorrelated with changes of
Dit. However, including an additive fixed effect in quantile regression, as done in mean
regressions, alters the interpretation of the coefficients. For example, consider the two
14Note that capital letters denote random variables (i.e., observed in the data) and lower case letters
denote the potential outcome (i.e., the counterfactual outcome to be modeled).
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specifications
Yit = αi +D
′
itβ(Uit) and Yit = αi(Uit) +D
′
itβ(Uit) (3.5)
of Koenker (2004) and Harding and Lamarche (2009), respectively. The underlying SQF
for these two location-shift type specifications found in (3.5) take the form
SY (τ |d, αi) = αi + d′β˜(τ), τ ∈ (0, 1) (3.6)
where τ now refers to the τ th quantile of Uit, not U
∗
it. In other words, the quantiles
are now defined relative to a the child’s fixed level of diet quality. While correct in
specification, it is not the ideal interpretation for our primary policy question: what
is the effect of food source on low dietary quality children separate from high dietary
quality children.
In the estimation strategy laid out below, the policy variables D are allowed unspec-
ified correlation with individual fixed effects, αi = h(Di1, . . . , DiT , εi). This arbitrary
correlation mirrors mean fixed effects, but αi is not estimated. The estimator therefore
assumes that the unconditional distribution of U∗it is uniform but relaxes the conditional
distribution assumption by allowing U∗it|Dit, αi  U(0, 1). Specifically, I will estimate a
specification that is related to the SQF taking the form
SY (τ |d) = γht(τ) + d′β(τ), τ ∈ (0, 1) (3.7)
where τ now refers to U∗it, a child’s total proneness to consume a healthy diet, which is
precisely what we want to estimate. Note that the SQFs in equations (3.3) and (3.7)
are the same, except that the implicit constant in (3.3) is now explicitly defined as γht.
The parameter vector γht plays the primary role for identification (sample moment 2
in the next section). The index h can refer to any set of exogenous characteristics that
saturate the sample space over time t, or simply time itself. For example, it is likely that
a “high-quality diet” on a weekday is much different than a “high-quality diet” on the
weekend, if not for the simple fact that children do not attend school on the weekend.
Therefore, I construct fixed effects based on the interview day (t = 1, 2) and the day of
the week in which the survey took place (h = 1, . . . , 7).
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3.6 Estimation
The SQF I will estimate is
SHEIit = γht(τ) + FFSitβ1(τ) + FAFHitβ2(τ), τ ∈ (0, 1). (3.8)
The underlying model corresponding to (3.8) is
HEIit = γht(U
∗
it) + FFSitβ1(U
∗
it) + FAFHitβ2(U
∗
it) (3.9)
where HEIit is the measure of diet quality and γht contains the 14 fixed effects as defined
by the space ht = {h×t}. Estimating equation (3.9) is not straightforward; the function
is highly non-convex with many local optima, but it does have a well-pronounce global
optimum. For brevity, I list the moment conditions here because they give intuition
how estimation proceeds. See Powell (2014) for full details of estimation.
Referring to equation (3.9), let D ≡ (γ1, . . . , γT , X) where X = (FFS, FAFH) are
the policy variables of interest. To simplify notation of the moment conditions, I will
refer to γht as simply γt but note that the fixed effects still refer to the t
th day of intake
on the hth day of the week. The (weighted) sample moments are
gi(b) = wi
1
T
T∑
t=1
Xit
[
1(Yit ≤ D′itb)−
1
T
T∑
s=1
1(Yis ≤ D′isb)
]
(3.10)
ht(b) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
wi1(Yit ≤ D′itb)− τ for all t (3.11)
where wi is the survey weight supplied by NHANES, which has been normalized to sum
to N . The fixed effects force ht(b) = 0 for all t, thus confining all “guesses” of b to the
parameter set B,
B ≡
{
b
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
1(Yit ≤ D′itb) = τ for all t
}
. (3.12)
By letting b˜ be the the coefficient vector on Xit we can write D
′
itb = γt+X
′
itb˜. Recalling
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that we have allowed arbitrary correlation between the fixed effects and the policy
variables, we can define γt(τ, b˜) as the τ
th quantile of the distribution Yit−X ′itb˜ for each
fixed-effect value t. Therefore, γˆt(τ, b˜) solves
1
N
N∑
i=1
wi1(Yit −X ′itb˜ ≤ γˆt(τ, b˜)) = τ (3.13)
and it immediately follows that for any guess b˜, γˆt(τ, b˜) is known.
Estimation proceeds in a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) framework:
βˆ(τ) = arg min
b∈B
(
1√
N
N∑
i=1
gi(b)
)′
Wn(b)
(
1√
N
N∑
i=1
gi(b)
)
. (3.14)
For surveys with stratification and clustering, the weighting matrix Wn(b) is defined
following Bhattacharya (2005, equation 6). With one or two treatment variables, grid
searching is computationally achievable (Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2008) but can still
be quite burdensome in practice. If bootstrapping is necessary for inference, the problem
is exasperated.
Yu and Moheed (2001) show that parameters in a quantile regression can be esti-
mated via Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms. Chernozhukov and Hong
(2003) generalized this technique into a GMM framework, which is suitable in this in-
stance due to the complex survey design. Moreover, Chernozhukov and Hong (2003)
show that inferences can be drawn from the posterior distribution. This key develop-
ment dramatically reduces computation.
In this paper, I use an adaptive MCMC algorithm using code developed by Powell,
Smith, and Baker (2014). Appendix B.4 provides details of the algorithm. In short,
estimators and 90-percent confidence intervals are taken from the mean and quantiles
of the posterior distribution.
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3.7 Results
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 plot coefficient estimates for food from school (FFS) and food
away from home (FAFH), respectively, using equation (3.9).15 As a reminder, the
policy variables are defined as the proportion of daily calorie intake from each food
source (i.e., Dit ∈ [0, 1]). Thus, results can be interpreted as the marginal impact of
reallocating calories from FFH to either FFS or FAFH by rescaling estimates using the
average conditional allocation of calories found in table 4.1. For example, the coefficient
estimate for FFS at the fifth percentile of the HEI distribution is 5.03 and holding calorie
consumption constant at 33-percent, results in a 1.68 point increase. School meals are
not of higher relative quality across the entire distribution – the coefficient estimate at
the 95th percentile is -3.08, implying a 1.03 point decrease in HEI when shifting 33% of
calories from home to school.
Although I do not estimate the long-run impacts on dietary quality, numerous ex-
perimental trials have shown that simple and repeated exposures to new and healthy
foods have lasting impacts on dietary choices (Benton, 2004). For children falling in the
lowest quartile of the HEI distribution, figure 3.1 implies a positive daily investment in
nutrition skill formation, which could have long-run implications on nutrition capital
accumulation.
Figure 3.2 clearly shows the negative effects of FAFH on dietary quality. One im-
portant finding from figure 3.2 is that home-prepared food is of no higher quality than
FAFH in the bottom portion of the HEI distribution. Coupled with the findings in
figure 3.1, results suggest that kilocalorie consumption at school increases dietary qual-
ity to a larger degree than both home and away-from-home calories for those prone to
relatively low quality diets.
3.8 Discussion and Conclusion
Food preferences reflect a complex cognitive structure rooted in early childhood experi-
ences, exposures and environments. The formation of skills related to nutrition, such as
15In appendix table B.2, I report coefficient estimates and 95-percent confidence intervals for every
fifth quantile. As a basis of comparison, in the appendix I also plot results from two cross-sectional
quantile regressions.
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Figure 3.1: Impact of Food from School (FFS) on the Distribution of Dietary Quality
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Note: Dietary quality is measured using the HEI-2005. Food from school (FFS) is measured as the
share of daily caloric intake from school food.
ability to maintain energy balance and reach satisfactory levels of dietary quality, are
learned and applied at early stages in life (Benton, 2004; Birch, 1999). The ability to
adopt new skills, however, dissipates as one reaches adulthood (Morales et al., 2002).
This insight into nutrition skill formation largely mirrors the expanding body of litera-
ture that has emerged in the past decade promoting skill formation and human capital
development at early ages (Cunha et al., 2006).
The SBP and NSLP have undergone many reforms since the 1960’s (Ralston et al.,
2008). Originally aimed at alleviating hunger and malnutrition, these programs now
strive to reach a balance between nutritional quality and caloric quantity. The most
recent reform came from the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010. Officially in effect
for the 2013 school year, schools now have to meet new caloric and nutritional standards
(Code of Federal Regulations, Title 7, Parts 210 and 220, 2013). Early evidence suggests
higher standards for school meals improve child health outcomes (Taber et al., 2013).
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Figure 3.2: Impact of Food Away from Home (FAFH) on the Distribution of Dietary
Quality
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Note: Dietary quality is measured using the HEI-2005. Food away from home (FAFH) is measured as
the share of daily calories consumed away from home.
Moreover, localized experiments have shown that children are more likely to choose
more nutritious meals after such a program is introduced and tend to make progressively
healthier food choices the longer the program is in place (Grainger, Senauer and Runge,
2007).
Results of this study suggest there exists a large and meaningful impact of food
served under National School Lunch and Breakfast Programs for children that ex-
hibit low underlying dietary quality. These two Federal programs help children from
nutrtionally-disadvantaged environments to experience much needed dietary exposure
and variety. The daily exposure to a higher quality meal potentially has a lasting and
positive impact on nutrition capital accumulation. As policymakers and health advo-
cates look to policy-amendable arenas to improve the American diet, this study suggests
the NSLP and SBP are fertile grounds for intervention.
Chapter 4
Cashing Out SNAP:
Heterogeneous Impacts on
Dietary Quantity and Quality
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4.1 Introduction
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is the United States’ principal
food and nutrition assistance program, providing $76 billion in food vouchers to over
47 million individuals in 2013 (FNS, 2014); nearly half of all children will receive SNAP
at some point before age 20 (Rank and Hirschl, 2009). SNAP has a dual mandate,
both to “alleviate hunger” and also to “permit low-income households to obtain a more
nutritious diet” (Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008). SNAP attempts to
accomplish this goal by providing benefits in the form of an in-kind transfer to ensure
that publicly provided benefits are spent on food.
The extent to which SNAP accomplishes its dual mandate, over and above what
could be accomplished via an unconditional cash transfer remains an open and impor-
tant question. Standard economic theory states that as long as the total value of food
assistance is less than the household’s food budget, the manner in which benefits are
transferred should not alter consumption (Southworth, 1945). On the other hand, be-
havioral economics, specifically the notion of mental accounting or income fungibility
– the idea that “money in one mental account is not a perfect substitute for money in
another account” (Thaler, 1990) – may provide theoretical support for the hypothesis
that the form of the benefit may affect the way in which it is spent.1
The empirical evidence on this question is mixed with some studies finding evidence
in support of income fungibility (Hymans and Shapiro, 1978; Moffit, 1989; Whitmore,
2002; Hoynes and Schanzenbach, 2009) and others finding evidence against it (Senauer
and Young, 1986; Levedhal, 1995; Beatty and Tuttle, 2014) or with mixed results (Bre-
unig and Dasgupta, 2002, 2005). Moreover, differences in expenditures do not necessar-
ily translate into differences in consumption (Aguiar and Hurst, 2005). Previous work
that focuses on spending rather than consumption may miss the effect of an in-kind
transfer on diet quality and quantity.
We investigate whether receiving food assistance in the form of cash, rather than as
a voucher, affects either the quantity and/or the quality of food consumed in the home.
This is particularly important to policymakers because the current policy prescription
1This type of behavior is sometimes called a ‘labeling effect’ (e.g, Kooreman, 2000; Beatty et al.,
2014). The labeling effect is a behavioral response to the name given to benefit transfer (be it cash or
in-kind) that increases the consumption of that good.
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implicitly assumes that a voucher dollar is marginally no worse than a cash benefit
dollar. With regards to nutrition, the assumption is that beneficiaries’ food supplies
at home are of equal or superior quality when given food vouchers as compared to an
equal transfer of cash. The current program also assumes that the quantity of food
used in the home is closer to optimal under the voucher system. We investigate to what
extent these assumptions hold and what this implies for SNAP policy. Our identification
strategy relies on the cornerstone “cash-out experiment” conducted in 1990 in which a
randomized set of the food stamp caseload in San Diego county received their benefits
in the form of check rather than food stamps (i.e., the voucher).
This paper advances the literature in many dimensions. First, we study the cash-
out effect on consumption rather than expenditure. This aligns our study with the
stated goals of the SNAP program. We measure the quantity of food used by a house-
hold in terms of kilocalories. Previous work has largely studied the cash out effect
in terms of expenditure (Moffit, 1989; Levedhal, 1995; Breunig and Dasgupta, 2002,
2005) although others have investigated kilocalories with mixed results (Ohls et al.,
1992; Bishop, Formby and Zeager, 2000; Whitmore, 2002).2 Second, we measure the
quality of food used in the home via a single dietary index. Previous research has taken
a one-at-a-time approach – studying individual nutrients and/or food groups (Ohls et
al., 1992; Bishop, Formby and Zeager, 2000; Whitmore, 2002). When studied in this
manner, drawing a conclusion about the overall effect of receiving cash benefits on diet
quality is difficult. We take a holistic view of dietary quality and calculate a single
dietary score using a widely-used and validated measure, the Healthy Eating Index.
We also innovate with regards to method. We study the effect of cash-out on the dis-
tribution of diet quality and quantity; allowing for heterogeneity between low-consuming
households and high-consuming households is important. For example, we may be more
concerned about the effect of cash-out on outcomes below or above some reasonable
threshold rather than central effects. In contrast to previous studies that have taken a
distributional approach, we model control variables separate from the policy variables.
The distinction is subtle but important when interpreting quantile treatment effects
(see, for example, Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2005; Powell, 2013). Policy variables
2Ohls et al. find no effect. Bishop et al. and Whitmore both find some evidence of overconsumption
among voucher recipients, although insignificant.
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have a direct impact on the outcome distribution (i.e., a structural treatment effect
interpretation), whereas control variables aid in identification and/or possible variance
reduction (i.e., an econometric or modeling issue). We discuss these differences and
their importance in more detail in the methods sections.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first discuss the related background, followed by
a description of our primary dataset, the San Diego cash out experiment. We then show
how we construct a measure of dietary quality. We then introduce the structural model
of interest. A descriptive analysis is used to motivate our estimation and inference
procedures. We concluded with policy implications.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Mental Accounting and Income Fungibility
We briefly describe two components of mental accounting that relate to the decision
making process of food assistance beneficiaries.3 The first component is how households
assign income sources (or flows of resources) to specific accounts based on their usage.
For example, a household may have an account to purchase food and a separate account
to pay utility bills. The type of resource (e.g., cash, voucher or gifts) can dictate the
overall assignment of all resources to each account. If income is not perfectly fungible,
then a voucher may be assigned differently than an equal value of cash.
The second component of mental accounting related to food purchases is “transaction
utility.” Thaler (1985, 1999) describes the utility derived from a purchase transaction
as the value of the “deal,” but we can also think of this as the shadow price of the
income source. Indeed, Levedahl (1995) provides a theoretical framework in which
food purchased with cash enters the household utility function separately from food
purchased with a voucher. In other words, the relative utility of a cash transaction
versus a voucher transaction for an otherwise identical food bundle can yield different
utilities.4
3See Thaler (1980, 1985, 1990, 1999) for a more complete treatment of mental accounting.
4Specifically, suppose F is food bought with cash, S is food bought with vouchers and X is a
composite good where p is the price of food relative to the composite good. The household has total
resources Y which is the sum of cash income I and voucher income V . The household maximizes
L = U(F, S,X) + λ1(I − pF − X) + λ2(V − pS) where λ1 and λ2 are the shadow prices of cash and
voucher income, respectively. In equilibrium, the total demand for food will be a function of λ2/λ1.
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Taken together, these two components of mental accounting describe the theoretical
framework in which the way SNAP recipients receive benefits can affect the budgeting
process and ultimately the bundle of goods purchased. The next section summarizes
the large body of empirical evidence against the notion of income being perfectly sub-
stitutable.
4.2.2 Empirical Evidence on Income Fungibility
The question of how food assistance benefits affect expenditure allocations is not a new
one (see, Southworth, 1945). Hymans and Shapiro (1976) studied how three income
sources – wage, cash transfers and food stamps – affect food expenditures. They find
that income-supplement programs “permit a higher standard of food consumption. But
they have minimal effects on either the overall marginal propensity to consume food
or the income elasticity of food consumption.” In effect, they find no difference in
expenditures.
Senauer and Young (1986) used data from the 1978-79 Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics, which straddles an important policy change in the food stamp program – the
elimination of the purchase requirement. Despite the program rule changes, they find
that in both years the traditional Southworth model is rejected. Interestingly, they
(indirectly) cite behavioral mechanisms as one possible explanation. They hypothesize
that the in-kind transfer generates a “sense of gratitude or responsibility...to expand
their food consumption” (i.e., a labeling effect).
More recent papers have used the San Diego cash out experiment to test income
fungibility. Levedahl (1995) develops a theoretical model whereby food bought with
cash and stamps enter the utility function as two separate goods. When testing several
specifications, Levendahl also finds a higher marginal propensity to spend (MPS) on food
when using stamps, also lending evidence against perfect substitutability of resources.
In a series of papers using the San Diego data, Breunig and Dasgupta (2002, 2003,
2005) again find a higher MPS on food purchased with stamps and reject the hypothesis
that stigma is the underlying cause. Breunig and Dasgupta (2005) show that households
with a single decision maker, as opposed to two or more, exhibit no such cash out effect.
Although their main hypothesis is that the intrahousehold allocation process contributes
Cash and voucher income are perfectly fungible only when λ2/λ1 is equal to 1.
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to the cash out effect, they only test this theory indirectly by calculating the MPS for
singles versus multi-headed households. An alternative hypothesis consistent with their
finding is that households with one decision maker have a different array of resources
as compared to those with more than one decision maker. This would follow from an
economies of scale argument.
Finally, Whitmore (2002), using the San Diego data, finds no differences in con-
sumption patterns. On the other hand, she finds that the probability of consuming
more than twice the RDA for calories is lower among check recipients.
4.3 Description of Data Sources
Our primary data source is the 1990 San Diego cash out experiment. The purpose of
this randomized experiment was to determine how households respond to receiving their
food stamp benefits in the form of a check rather than stamps. The experiment began
in July 1989, and the survey took place almost a year later from May to mid-August
1990. In September 1990 the remaining caseload and all new cases were cashed out for
the next five years.5
We utilize in-person surveys of about 600 check and 600 coupon recipients. Selec-
tion into these groups were randomly assigned based on the last digit of the household’s
program case number. The initial in-person interview obtained demographic informa-
tion from the household head and all household members. The interviewer then notified
respondents they would come back seven days later to ask about food used in the house-
hold over the seven-day period and about purchases of food at eating establishments.
The main interview occurred seven days later to obtain information about food used
in the home over the seven day period. Quantities (in pounds), the price paid, and its
source (purchases, WIC voucher, or home-produced/gifted) of all food items used in the
home were recorded and grouped into 32 food groups. The main interview also reported
5Four cash-out demonstrations were implemented in the early 1990s. The San Diego and Alabama
studies were “pure” cash out in the sense that they were randomized experiments (Ohls et al., 1992).
However, the Alabama cash-out demonstration was limited to 8 months, the response rate was correlated
with treatment status, and some check-receiving households were encouraged to spend their benefits
on food (Whitmore, 2002). The Washington State and Alabama ASSETS studies were part of a more
comprehensive welfare reform experiment and did not focus solely on cash out. As a result, we focus
on the San Diego demonstration as done elsewhere in the literature.
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expenditures at eating establishments outside the home over the previous week but did
not distinguish these expenditures by food group nor report quantities. In the analysis
below, we will use these expenditure categories as a measure of available resources to
the household to obtain food. The main interview also asked detailed expenditure
information over the previous month for nine other broad categories (housing, utility,
medical, transportation, clothing, eduction, dependent care, recreation and personal
items). Together, these represent non-food expenditures.
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics for all control variables used in our analysis.
As done in previous studies, we drop households that do not report complete infor-
mation, individuals that are homeless or reside in a group home, and two households
that report conflicting information (n = 151). As expected, only food bought with cash
and voucher income are significantly different between the treatment and control groups
(p-value = 0.03).
4.3.1 Measuring Quantity
We use kilocalories as our measure of the quantity of food used in the household. The
total amount of calories consumed from the household supply over the seven-day period
will depend on household composition, meals served to guests, and meals eaten away
from home. In order to compare calorie consumption across all households, we need
to rescale calories accordingly (Ohls et al., 1992). In short, this scale is a function of
the number of household members, their age/gender, number of meals eaten away from
home and the number of meals eaten by guests.
The primary factor is the age/gender composition of household members. For exam-
ple, as shown in table 4.2, a twelve year old girl’s calorie needs are about three-fourths
of that of a 30 year old male. Setting the reference person as a 23-50 year old male, the
sum of each household member’s relative needs generates the household size in adult
male equivalents (AME). Thus, the household size for the family of four in table 4.2 in
AME is 3.55.6
6The Recommended Daily Allowance (RDA) for calories given in table 4.2 correspond to 1990’s
standards. The most current RDA for calories further delineates by three activity levels (sedentary,
moderately active and active). The 1990 RDAs given in the data roughly correspond to an active
lifestyle. This does not affect our analysis because the relative needs ratios are similar across activity
levels. Moreover, the data do not permit us to calculate activity levels.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics for control variables
Variable Cash Voucher p-value
Household Head Characteristics
Non-Hispanic white 0.34 0.31 0.285
Non-Hispanic black 0.18 0.22 0.103
Hispanic 0.32 0.34 0.617
Other race/ethnicity 0.15 0.13 0.262
Age 32.75 (9.91) 32.16 (9.61) 0.325
Female 0.87 0.89 0.523
Married 0.26 0.23 0.267
Employment and Education
Less than highschool 0.44 0.42 0.490
Highschool graduate 0.23 0.24 0.694
Some college 0.33 0.34 0.712
At least one member employed 0.19 0.21 0.473
Household Composition
Infant present (1-2yr) 0.27 0.27 0.915
Toddler present (3-5yr) 0.48 0.50 0.625
Adolescent present (6-11yr) 0.50 0.50 0.806
Teenager present (12-18yr) 0.35 0.34 0.831
Single decision makera 0.60 0.57 0.356
log(household size) 1.12 (0.47) 1.17 (0.46) 0.114
Resources
Food purchases ($/wk) 65.70 (40.63) 71.31 (44.08) 0.031
WIC purchases ($/wk) 2.61 (6.59) 2.69 (11.56) 0.890
Food gifted/home-grown ($/wk) 1.37 (5.39) 1.11 (3.93) 0.366
Food away from home ($/wk) 9.59 (17.86) 10.40 (17.68) 0.458
Non-food expenditures ($/month) 651.14 (303.81) 651.69 (306.89) 0.977
Number of households 532 530
Source: 1990 San Diego Cash Out Demonstration.
aOne non-child adult in the household. See Bruenig and Dasgupta (2002, 2005).
Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses. p-values test the null of equality
between cash and voucher.
A second consideration must be given to the number of meals eaten at away es-
tablishments versus from household stocks. In the example from table 4.2 we can see
that the male head ate two-thirds of his meals at home. Therefore, when calculating
the effective household size in Equivalent Nutrient Units (ENU), we scale him down by
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Table 4.2: Calculation of household size in AME and ENU
RDA for Relative Portion Equivalent
Household energy needs of meals Nutrient
member (kcal) (AME) at-home Units
Male, aged 30 2,900 1 0.67 0.67
Female, aged 30 2,200 0.76 1 0.76
Male, aged 15 3,000 1.03 1 1.03
Female, aged 12 2,200 0.76 1 0.76
Household size 3.55 3.22
Note: AME=adult male equivalent. ENU = Equivalent Nutrient Units.
RDA=Recommended Daily Allowance.
Source: Recreated from Ohls et al. (1993).
0.67. In this manner, the example household size in ENU for the survey week is 3.22.
The final consideration is the number of meals served to guests from household
stocks. The data provide the number of meals served to guests by age/gender in AME.
In the final calculation of effective household size in ENU given in the data, these meals
are taken into account. Note that in the example from table 4.2 no meals were served
to guests, so that the final size is 3.22. The use of ENU is the preferred equivalence
scale, rather than simply AME (Ohls et al., 1993). Moreover, using ENU is consistent
with previous studies (Ohls et al., 1992; Bishop, Formby and Zeager, 2000; Whitmore,
2002).
To summarize, we use the total number of reported calories used from household
food supplies. We then normalize calories by the household’s effect size in ENU. In the
descriptive statistics and analyses below, we report calories on a daily basis by dividing
by seven days. Since the reported kilocalories represent purchase quantities and not
actual consumption, we scale down kilocalories to account for food spoilage, waste
and inedible portions. Most current research estimates food losses at the household
level in 1990 to be about 37% ± 6% (Hall et al., 2009). Note that these monotonic
transformations have no effect on inference, but rather give a more accurate picture of
actual consumption on a per-day, per-person basis.7
7We believe this is important because previous studies (Bishop et al. and Whitmore) have used the
ratio of total available calories to the RDA as a measure of food adequacy. This would be an inaccurate
measure since many of the available calories are not actually consumed.
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4.3.2 Measuring Quality
We construct a per-calorie diet quality index based on the quantities of food used from
household food supplies. We use the Healthy Eating Index, which was developed in 1995
to measure compliance to the U.S. Government’s official recommendations for healthful
eating, the Dietary Guidelines for Americans (DGA). Every five years, based on an
expert advisory panel, the DGA are revised by the U.S. Departments of Agriculture
(USDA) and Health and Human Services (HHS). As such, the HEI has been updated
several times to reflect the most current state of nutrition knowledge. This paper uses
the HEI-2005 and will henceforth refer to the HEI-2005 as simply HEI.8
The HEI is the sum of 12 components based on the consumption of various foods or
nutrients relative to total consumption. In this way, the HEI captures the relative quality
of all foods consumed within the household and is invariant to household composition
due to its per-calorie measurement. Each component assigns a score ranging from 0 to
5 (total fruit, whole fruit, total vegetables, dark green/orange vegetables and legumes,
total grains, whole grains), 0 to 10 (milk, meats and beans, oils, saturated fat, sodium)
or 0 to 20 for the percentage of calories from solid fats, alcoholic beverages, and added
sugars (SoFAAS) creating a maximum score of 100. Appendix table C.1 provides exact
details of the scoring (see also, Guenther et al., 2008a).
The HEI has been widely used and evaluated as a valid measure of diet quality
(Guenther et al., 2008b). In the medical literature, lower HEI scores are associated
with higher risks of coronary heart disease, stroke and diabetes (Chuive et al., 2012),
cardiovascular disease (Nicklas et al., 2012), and several cancers (Bosire et al., 2013;
Reedy et al., 2008; Shahril, 2012). It is important to reiterate that the HEI is a per-
calorie measure of dietary quality and does not directly consider excessive calorie intake.
This distinction is necessary to analyze the relative quality of foods consumed across
households of differing calorie needs, and it allows us to analyze quality separate from
quantity.
Like most food recall surveys, respondents report foods, or in this case 32 food
groups, and not the individual components of the HEI. For this reason, the USDA has
created a dataset that maps some 7,000 individual foods into their HEI components. The
8Future work will use the HEI-2010. Note that the two have many similarities (see, National Cancer
Institute, 2013).
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32 food groups from the San Diego data are not ad hoc, and were chosen based on the
Thrifty Food Plan (TFP).9 In fact, food data collected in the San Diego experiment use
the same data entry system, the USDA Human Nutrition Information System (Ohls
et al., 1992, p. C.4), used in USDA’s 1989-91 Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by
Individuals (CFSII). Therefore, the individual foods reported in the CSFII have a rather
natural mapping into the 32 TFP food groups.10
Using the 1989-91 CSFII, we can calculate the average amounts of each of the 12 HEI
components for the 32 food groups on a per-gram basis. For example, the “high-fiber
breakfast cereal” group contains 0.03 cups of fruit, 6.1 grams of whole grains and 395
kilocalories per 100 grams (roughly 3 servings).11 In order to more accurately reflect
the mix of foods eaten within each group by beneficiaries in San Diego, we use only
CSFII households that reside in the Western U.S. and have income less than 130% of
the poverty line.12
As a measure of validating our approach we can compare imputed values of kilo-
calories and saturated fat from the CSFII data to those reported in the San Diego
data. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given that similar food recall and data entry methods
were used, the imputed measures of these two nutrients are similar using either method
(see appendix figures C.1 and C.2).
9The TFP is USDA’s yardstick for determining benefit levels for many of its nutritional assistance
programs, such as the Food Stamp Program in 1990.
10See appendix table C.2 for details, which follows the methodology outlined in TFP reports (Carlson
et al., 2003, 2007).
11Each nutrient value is calculated for 100 grams of edible food. The San Diego data report poundage
of food used from stocks, not the amounts eaten. This does not affect our analysis of quality because
every HEI component is measured as the ratio of component intake to calorie intake. In other words,
the amount of food that is wasted or spoils cancels out in the calculation of each HEI component.
12We also considered using the entire sample that report receiving food stamps, as well as everyone
in the sample below 130% of the poverty line. However, when we examined the demographic makeups
and the types of food eaten across these three groups, we concluded that conditioning on geography
and income resulted in a large enough sample and best reflected the San Diego sample.
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4.4 Descriptive Measures
4.4.1 Mean Outcomes
The unconditional mean of kilocalorie consumption per day per adult male equivalent
after adjusting for waste and spoilage is 2,486 with a standard error of 33.7.13 The mean
HEI-2005 score is 49.93 with a standard error of 0.24.14 The first column of table 4.3
reports the simple difference in means by regressing the outcome on a dummy for cash
households. Columns 2-5 subsequently add in more control variables found in table 4.1.
With the exception of the unconditional case for kilocalories, there appears to be no
mean effect of receiving benefits in the form of cash or as a voucher.
Table 4.3 does provide us with some additional information. We can see that some
of the covariates have a significant impact on households’ placement in the outcome
distribution. Specifically, resources have a positive impact on a household’s central
tendency (see appendix tables C.3 and C.4). The R-squared increases substantially
when including resources into the regression for kilocalories indicating their value in the
inclusion of the analysis. In the next section, we display results for the unconditional
distributions.
4.4.2 Distributional Outcomes
We plot the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of kilocalorie consumption and
HEI scores in figures 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. As noted above, kilocalories have been
normalized to adult male equivalents and adjusted for wasted and spoilage. The in-
verses of the CDFs describe the quantile processes for the cash and voucher groups; the
difference between these processes lead to the unconditional QTEs.
Recommended kilocalorie intakes are given in three levels depending on one’s level of
physical activity. These three levels are represented by the vertical lines and correspond
to a 30-year old male. We can see roughly half of all households report consuming food
below all three recommendations, while over 20% report consuming levels well above the
13The average daily intake of kilocalories in AME in the 1989-91 CSFII sample used to calculate the
HEI-2005 in this study is 2,340 with a standard error of 32.8.
14Beatty, Lin and Smith (2014) calculate HEI-2005 scores for low-income adults in the 1989-91 CSFII.
They find an average of 48.96 for this nationally representative sample, which is reassuring to the
imputation method used in this study.
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Table 4.3: Mean Effect of Receiving Cash on kilocalories and HEI-2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome: kilocalories
Cash -114.068∗ -92.064 -91.755 -107.969 -40.248
(67.691) (66.957) (67.068) (67.089) (54.223)
Constant 2544.263∗∗∗ 2214.279∗∗∗ 2271.766∗∗∗ 2480.040∗∗∗ 1922.301∗∗∗
(47.910) (195.593) (211.894) (242.139) (199.770)
R-squared 0.003 0.035 0.035 0.047 0.383
Outcome: HEI-2005
Cash 0.529 0.280 0.305 0.306 0.412
(0.473) (0.455) (0.453) (0.453) (0.449)
Constant 49.650∗∗∗ 49.004∗∗∗ 50.570∗∗∗ 48.359∗∗∗ 47.937∗∗∗
(0.335) (1.328) (1.432) (1.635) (1.655)
R-squared 0.001 0.089 0.098 0.110 0.134
Demographicsa X X X X
Edu. & emp.a X X X
Compositiona X X
Resourcesa X
Observations 1,062 1,062 1,062 1,062 1,062
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
aSee table 4.1 for definitions.
recommendation for an active lifestyle. We acknowledge this is a rather noisy approach
to accounting for food spoilage (although it does not affect inference procedures), and
that some households may have a mix of sedentary and active individuals. Nevertheless,
the point is that our sample consists of a variety of households consuming below, at,
or above any reasonable threshold for calorie consumption. Overall, it appears that
vouchers encourage food consumption at least above the 20th percentile.
Given figure 4.1, we can see that a stochastic dominance approach for kilocalories,
as done in Bishop et al., is inappropriate. This is because one of the underlying assump-
tions of stochastic dominance is that expected social welfare is monotonic in kilocalorie
consumption. Clearly, society would prefer those below subsistence levels, or food inse-
cure households, to consume more calories. On the other hand, society would be better
off if over-consuming households consumed less food. Therefore, one can not maintain
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of kilocalorie consumption from household food supply
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Note: Calories are measured in Equivalent Nutrient Units (ENU), which accounts for the number of
household members, their age/gender, number of meals eaten away from home and the number of meals
eaten by guests. We also scale the x-axis down by 37% to account for food spoilage and waste. Active,
moderate and sedentary refer to physical activity lifestyles and corresponding RDA for kilocalories. See
text for explanations.
the assumption that social welfare is increasing (or decreasing) at all levels of kilocalorie
consumption. The dominance approach however would be appropriate for quality.
The next section develops a framework in which we make no assumptions about
social welfare but can test for changes in the distribution of outcomes. We will then
estimate a model that controls for covariates while estimating the unconditional QTE.
4.5 The Structural Model
Our model follows a potential outcome framework akin to Heckman and Robb (1986)
and extended to quantile treatment effect (QTE) models in Chernozhukov and Hansen
(2005). Under this framework, a policymaker has two distinct policies d ∈ {0, 1} from
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Figure 4.2: Healthy Eating Index-2005 scores for household food supply
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which they may choose to impose on SNAP households. The potential outcome for
a household in each treatment state is denoted by Yd. We refer to these outcomes
as potential (or latent) because the true treatment status D is only observed for one
component of the potential outcomes, Y ≡ YD.15
This research aims to learn about the distribution of the potential outcomes under a
cash versus voucher system. The τ th quantile of the potential outcomes vector {Yd} can
be described by the quantile treatment response function q(d, τ). This function has a
structural, or counterfactual interpretation because τ indexes unobserved “proneness,”
or preference heterogeneity.16 Under this framework, high values of τ indicate a high
preference for food quality or food quantities and vice-versa. Understanding the distri-
butional impacts of the cash out effect is important when we consider the heterogeneity
of food preferences.
15Following the literature, capital letters denote random variables (i.e., observed in the data) and a
lower case letter denotes the potential outcome (i.e., the counterfactual outcome to be modeled).
16Doksum (1974) introduced the term proneness, such as “prone to earn high wages” (i.e., ability) or
in this case, “prone to consume a high quality diet” or “prone to consume high quantities of food.”
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The quantile treatment effect (QTE) is the primary object of interest and describes
the difference between the two potential outcomes
q(d1, τ)− q(d0, τ) (4.1)
where d1 is the treatment (i.e., cash) and d0 is the control (i.e., vouchers). Equation (4.1)
describes the QTE when cashing out SNAP, which varies by latent food preferences
indexed by τ . Note that this is the “unconditional” QTE since we do include any other
conditioning variables x and only include the policy variable d.
Under conditional quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978), the quantile
treatment response function is q(d, x, τ) where control variables directly enter the struc-
tural equation. In this case, τ indexes the quantiles of the latent outcome Yd for a fixed
set of exogenous controls X = x. This changes the interpretation of the treatment effect
to a conditional QTE and equation (4.1) becomes q(d1, x, τ)− q(d0, x, τ). Estimates us-
ing this framework provide the impact of cash benefits for high-consuming households
relative to their observed levels of X. Some of these household may actually consume
low quantities of food or low quality food in the unconditional distribution.
Returning to the QTE in (4.1), the relationship between Yd and the quantile response
function q(d, τ) can be represented as (Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2005)
Yd = q(d, U
∗
d ) (4.2)
where U∗d is a structural error term and is distributed uniformly over (0, 1). U
∗
d de-
termines the relative rankings of households depending on treatment state. This in-
terpretation leads to the monotonicity assumption standard in quantile analysis that
q(d, τ) is increasing in τ (Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2005). Thus, U∗d has a natural
mapping to the latent proneness index τ . The rank similarity assumption of the model
only requires U∗d to be identically distributed across treatment states, i.e., U
∗
d=1 ∼ U∗d=0
(Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2005). U∗d ∼ U(0, 1) is simply a normalization. Concretely,
rank similarity implies households with a high preference for food, do so regardless of
the treatment state. This assumption is maintained due to the randomization of the
experiment.
The error term U∗d introduces heterogeneity into the model by allowing a household’s
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total proneness, or food preference, to vary within treatment groups. We say total
proneness because some of this proneness can be observed in the data (e.g., per-capita
spending on food or age composition of household members) while the rest is unobserved
proneness (e.g., tastes). For example, those with relatively higher spending on food may
have a higher taste for food relative to non-food; including this information enables us
to better model their total proneness without letting this covariate alter the structural
interpretation of equation (4.1). To see this more formally, Powell (2013) defines U∗d =
fd(X,Ud) where X are observed covariates that explain some of the proneness and Ud
is the unobserved component. No functional form restrictions are place on fd(·), Ud can
be multidimensional, and X does not need to be exogenous (Powell, 2013).
By defining U∗d = fd(X,Ud), the Powell estimator relaxes the conditional indepen-
dence assumption of Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) that U∗d |D,X ∼ U(0, 1) to the
more flexible assumption that U∗d |D,X ∼ U∗d |X. In other words, the Chernozhukov
and Hansen framework treats both D and X as policy variables, whereas the Powell
estimator allows X to inform the distribution of U∗d without treating the additional
covariates as policy variables. In either case, we still maintain the assumption that D
is exogenous due to the randomization of the cash-out experiment. As pointed out in
Powell (2013), if X is empty then all variables are policy variables and we return to the
Chernozhukov and Hansen framework since U∗d |D ∼ U∗d ∼ U(0, 1).
When the preceding assumptions are met, as we maintain, we can identify an un-
conditional QTE while still conditioning on the set of covariates X. Specifically, for
each τ ∈ (0, 1) we have a conditional and unconditional quantile restriction,
P [Y ≤ q(D, τ)|X,D] = P [Y ≤ q(D, τ)|X] (4.3)
P [Y ≤ q(D, τ)] = τ (4.4)
respectively. See Powell (2013) for proofs. These two conditions motivate the estimation
technique proposed by Powell (2013) and summarized in the next section.
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4.5.1 Estimation of Unconditional QTE
Estimation uses a method of moments procedure. The underlying model can be written
as
Yi = D
′
iβ(U
∗
i ) (4.5)
where the nonseparable error term U∗i is distributed uniformly over the unit inter-
val. The first moment condition corresponds to the quantile restriction found in equa-
tion (4.3). Using the independence of Di and [P (Yi ≤ D′iβ(τ))|Xi, Di) − P (Yi ≤
D′iβ(τ)|Xi)] we can define
gi(b) = Di
[
1(Yi ≤ D′ib)− τˆXi(b)
]
(4.6)
where τˆXi(b) ≡ Pˆ (Yi ≤ D′ib|Xi). Instead of assuming τˆXi(b) = τ for all i, as would be
the case if Xi were empty, the first moment condition allows us to relax this assumption
and let τ be a function of the control variables. Thus, the control variables still inform
the distribution of proneness to consume kilocalories or a high quality diet, but we still
estimate the unconditional QTE.
The second moment condition uses the unconditional quantile restriction in equa-
tion (4.4). This leads to
h(b) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
1(Yi ≤ D′ib)− τ (4.7)
which guarantees that (100× τ)% of the observations have Yi below D′ib.
Powell (2013) outlines an estimation procedure where the second moment condition
is used to confine all potential values of the coefficients to a compact set of values. First,
separate out the constant and define Di = (1, D˜i). Let γ(τ, b˜) be the τ
th quantile of
Yi − D˜′ib˜ such that
γˆ(τ, b˜) solves
1
N
N∑
i=1
1(Yi − D˜′ib˜ ≤ γˆ(τ, b˜)) = τ. (4.8)
Thus, for any guess b˜ the constant can be calculated by simply finding the τ th quantile
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of Yi− D˜′ib˜. With a guess of b˜ in hand and the corresponding calculation of γˆ(·) we can
now estimate τXi as a function of b˜ and γˆ. This is accomplished with the first moment
condition in equation (4.6) such that
τˆXi(b) = Pˆ (Yi ≤ γˆ(τ, b˜)− D˜′ib˜|Xi). (4.9)
One can see this is a probability model where the outcome equals 1 if Yi is less than
or equal to γˆ(τ, b˜) − D˜′ib˜ and zero otherwise. The covariates are Xi. Powell suggests
using a logit or probit model, although a linear probability model (LPM) would work
just as well. Regardless of the model used to estimate the proneness index τXi , we need
estimation error and misspecification to be orthogonal to Di, which again is maintained
by the randomization of the experiment.17
Estimation proceeds in a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) framework:
βˆ(τ) = arg min
b∈B
(
1√
N
N∑
i=1
gi(b)
)′
Wn(b)
(
1√
N
N∑
i=1
gi(b)
)
(4.10)
where Wn(b) is an appropriate weight matrix. With one or two treatment variables, grid
searching is computationally achievable using the inverse quantile regression approach
of Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006). If bootstrapping is necessary for inference, as is
the case here, the problem is exasperated.
Yu and Moheed (2001) show that parameters in a quantile regression can be esti-
mated via Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms. Chernozhukov and Hong
(2003) generalized this technique into a GMM framework. Moreover, Chernozhukov and
Hong (2003) show that inferences can be drawn from the posterior distribution given
the appropriate choice of Wn(b). We use a two-step procedure suggested by Yin (2009)
to construct Wn(b) using an adaptive MCMC algorithm outlined in Baker (2013). We
first let the algorithm run during a burn-in period (2000 draws). After burn-in, we take
2,000 more draws and construct an efficient weight matrix Wn(b) = [
1
ng(bˆ)
′g(bˆ)]−1 where
17Powell finds in his simulations and applications that a logit and probit work equally as well. A
linear probability model was not investigated but there is no reason to rule it out. In fact, we only
need E[τˆXi(b)] = τ which is satisfied by either of the 3 choices. Moreover, the LPM does not in-
volve the additional maximization procedure needed with a logit or probit and substantially speeds up
computation.
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bˆ is the mean value of the draws. With an efficient weighting matrix, we take 10,000
more draws from which inferences are drawn. We also use this procedure for estimating
the “standard” quantile regression where Xi is empty. The result gives robust inference
due to the two-step GMM procedure.
4.6 Results
All results presented in this section correspond to the model,
Yi = γ(U
∗
i ) + C
′
iβ(U
∗
i ) (4.11)
where γ is a constant and Ci is a dummy if household i received their benefits in the
form of cash. The standard quantile regression of Koenker and Bassett (1978) is labeled
as QR in tables 4.4 and 4.5 and figures 4.3 and 4.4. We also estimate 4 specifications of
the Generalized Quantile Regression (GQR).18 The GQR specifications mirror the OLS
specifications found in table 4.3. The interpretation of the GQR estimates also mirror
the OLS estimates – they both can be interpreted unconditional treatment effects while
controlling for a set of covariates. For example, OLS and median GQR both estimate
the impact of cash benefits on a measure of central tendency for the outcome. Indeed,
we can see results at the 50th quantile across the 5 quantile specifications exhibit a
similar pattern to those at the mean.
When examining the impact of cash in the tails of the kilocalorie distribution (ta-
ble 4.4 and figure 4.3), we can see consistent estimates across QR, GQR-1, GQR-2 and
GQR-3. When we include how households spend their resources (GQR-4), we see a
positive shift in the QTE at all quantiles – the positive impact at low quantiles becomes
significant and the negative impact at higher quantiles is closer to zero. The impact
throughout the interquartile range is very flat, indicating virtually no effect in the cen-
ter of the distribution of kilocalorie consumption. This finding lends evidence to the
hypothesis that how benefits are paid impacts the fungibility of income and thus how
resources are spent.
18A comparison of QR estimates to GQR-1, GQR-2 and GQR-3 can be found in appendix figures
C.6-C.5.
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Table 4.4: Effect of receiving cash on the distribution of kilocalories at selected quantiles
Outcome: kilocalories QR GQR-1 GQR-2 GQR-3 GQR-4
Quantiles
10 48.64 51.34 48.30 47.93 81.88∗
(55.33) (56.37) (56.06) (55.92) (50.72)
25 -82.33 -70.58 -76.66 -77.46 -29.02
(65.86) (67.43) (66.07) (67.23) (67.22)
50 -100.64∗ -81.33∗ -84.46∗ -91.32∗ -33.06
(73.62) (66.69) (68.03) (68.80) (61.18)
75 -144.62∗ -117.54∗ -121.90 -125.68∗ -33.95
(96.90) (93.00) (95.39) (92.25) (88.53)
90 -330.15∗∗ -281.64∗ -282.83∗ -288.51∗ -111.28
(218.49) (206.91) (207.15) (222.37) (182.71)
Demographicsa X X X X
Edu. & emp.a X X X
Compositiona X X
Resourcesa X
Observations 1,062 1,062 1,062 1,062 1,062
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗absolute value of 95% CI is positive. ∗absolute value of 90% CI is positive.
aSee table 4.1 for definitions.
The impact of cash on the distribution of dietary quality, as measured by the HEI-
2005, is mostly consistent across all specifications indicating the relative weak power of
the controls to explain the unobserved proneness to consume a healthful diet. Overall,
there appears to be a positive impact across the distribution although only significant
above the 40th quantiles.
4.6.1 Are good or bad foods driving the differences?
The HEI allows us to estimate the impact of cash on the distribution of adequacy
and moderation scores of the HEI. The adequacy scores range from 0-60 correspond
to the first 9 components (total fruit, whole fruit, total vegetables, dark green/orange
vegetables and legumes, total grains, whole grains, milk, meats and beans and oils) and
the moderation scores are constructed from the last three components (saturated fat,
sodium and empty calories) for the last 40 points. Although quantiles in each of these
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Table 4.5: Effect of receiving cash on the distribution of HEI-2005 scores for selected
quantiles
Outcome: HEI-2005 QR GQR-1 GQR-2 GQR-3 GQR-4
Quantiles
10 0.33 -0.17 -0.09 -0.16 0.22
(1.08) (1.10) (1.09) (1.08) (1.07)
25 0.38 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.23
(0.80) (0.81) (0.78) (0.79) (0.75)
50 0.69∗ 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.64∗
(0.45) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.44)
75 1.08∗ 0.91∗ 0.95∗ 0.90∗ 0.96∗
(0.65) (0.66) (0.65) (0.64) (0.63)
90 0.57 0.38 0.40 0.36 0.34
(0.99) (0.98) (0.98) (0.96) (1.00)
Demographicsa X X X X
Edu. & emp.a X X X
Compositiona X X
Resourcesa X
Observations 1,062 1,062 1,062 1,062 1,062
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗absolute value of 95% CI is positive. ∗absolute value of 90% CI is positive.
aSee table 4.1 for definitions.
distributions do not necessarily correspond to the quantiles in the total HEI scores, it
still allows us to answer the question: are good or bad foods driving the differences in
quality?
The difference in HEI scores across cash and vouchers is mainly driven by households
scoring better moderation scores (figure 4.5). As a reminder, a higher moderation score
means the household is consuming less “bad” components (i.e., sodium, saturated fat,
and empty calories). Coupled with the finding on kilocalories, it is likely that households
tend to purchase a food bundle that is less nutrient dense.
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Figure 4.3: Cash Out Effect on the Distribution of Kilocalories
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Figure 4.4: Cash Out Effect on the Distribution of Diet Quality
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Figure 4.5: Cash Out Effect on the Distribution of Diet Quality by Type
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4.7 Discussion and Conclusion
The United State’s largest nutritional safety net, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP), aims to both alleviate food insecurity and increase the nutritional
quality of household food supplies among beneficiaries. One mechanism the current
system uses to better reach these goals is to provide benefits in the form of a food
voucher, rather than in cash. The voucher system better reaches the goals of SNAP
only to the extent that, (1) if benefits were paid in cash, then participants would consume
less optimal quantities of food, and (2) cash benefits would be used to purchase lower
quality food as compared to in-kind benefits. This study finds evidence to the contrary.
We find that households with a very high proneness for kilocalorie consumption tend
to consume less calories when given cash rather a voucher. The portion of the kilocalo-
rie distribution that exhibits this effect is well above any reasonable recommendation.
Similarly, households with a low proneness for food consumption tend to purchase more
food under a cash system, and these households are below dietary recommendations.
We hypothesize these effects are due to behavioral mechanisms, namely mental account-
ing. Specifically, the padding of one mental account (i.e., the food budget) alters the
types of foods purchased. For example, households that have a high preference for food
(i.e., in the upper quantiles of the kilocalorie distribution) tend to buy even more food
with a voucher.
When we examine the distribution of dietary quality, we again see more favorable
results under a cash system over a voucher system. In the lower portion of the distri-
bution, we find some positive effects of cash but these are insignificant. For quantiles
above 40, the effect become larger and significant. Most of this improvement appears
to be due households consuming less foods that are calorie-dense.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
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In this dissertation I have explored the role of dietary quality in the United States
as a means of (1) measuring well-being, (2) analyzing the effectiveness of school food
programs and (3) showing how a shift from a voucher food assistance program to a cash
transfer program would impact household food consumption.
In the first analysis, I found contrary to popular wisdom that adult dietary quality
has been improving in the United States over the last twenty years. Even after account-
ing for changes in the demographic makeup (i.e., age, race/ethnicity and education)
there is still a large a substantial unexplained improvement. Moreover, the role of food
reformulation (e.g., the ingredients used in processed foods) has had a small but positive
impact on the quality of diets in adult Americans. The latter finding opens the door
for future investigation. Although I find small improvements, there is still substantial
room for improvement.
In the second analysis, I examined how school food and away food impacts child
dietary quality. Although it is almost universally accepted that away food has a negative
impact on diet quality, the previous literature has been mixed on the impact of school
food. I found that previous studies’ focus on mean effects of school food programs
have missed tail effects. In particular, children that exhibit low dietary quality at home
tend to benefit from eating a school meal whereas those in the upper portion of the
distribution do not. The implication is that school food programs not only have room
for improvement but already have meaningful impacts on at least some children.
In the third analysis, I took a novel approach to an old question: how should food
assistance benefits be paid? I began by focusing on the intended goals of the Sup-
plemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) – to “alleviate hunger” and also to
“permit low-income households to obtain a more nutritious diet.” This approach is
in contrast to previous studies’ focus purely on food expenditures. My approach was
able to uncover the impact of a cash system on both the quality and quantity of food
supplies in the home. I found that a cash system tends to increase the quality of the
diets for those in the upper portion of the distribution. For those in the lower portion of
the HEI-2005 distribution, there appears to be positive but insignificant impacts. With
regards to the quantity of the diet, one must acknowledge that from a social welfare
stance, some households may need more calories (i.e., those that are food insecure)
while others perhaps should consume less. With this fact in mind, I find that a cash
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system increases (decreases) the quantity of the diet for those well below (above) dietary
recommendations for kilocalorie intake. Overall, these findings imply a positive impact
of a cash system.
Overall, using dietary quality as an outcome measure has proved to be an effective
tool. Several previously unknown facts have been uncovered: (1) the quality of the
American diet is on the rise, (2) school food programs are effective for at least those
that are prone to very low dietary quality at home, and (3) food assistance programs
may better reach their intended goals if benefits were paid in cash. In all cases, tak-
ing a distributional approach has shown to uncover effects in the tails of the outcome
distribution.
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A.1 Calculating the HEI-2005 for the 1989–1991 CSFII
As mentioned in the text, the HEI-2005 is calculated by linking the MyPyramid Equiva-
lents Databases (MPEDs) to food intake surveys via USDA food codes.1 For the 1994-96
and 2005-08 surveys, recipe modification codes were included in addition to the food
codes. These modification codes do not appear in the 1989-91 CSFII.2 We drop all
duplicate food codes that have modifications in the MPEDv1 and retain all unmodified
foods. Previous research has shown that these modifications do not have significant
impacts on nutrient intakes (Ahuja, Steinfeldt and Perloff, 1999).
Of the 3,953 unique foods reported by adults 20 and older on day one in CSFII 1989-
91, 3,907 (98.8 percent) of these foods are in the MPEDv1. A total of 10,439 adults
reported complete intakes on day one in 1989–91, and 941 of these adults (9 percent)
reported consuming one of the 46 foods not found in MPEDv1. These individuals
are dropped from the sample. Alternatively, we could have constructed ‘best matches’
for each of the 46 foods, as done by the National Cancer Institute when creating an
equivalents database for NHANES III (1988-94) for the original HEI (National Cancer
Institute website, accessed February, 2012). We tried this for the 46 foods, allowing us
to keep all 10,439 adults; results were robust to this approach.
The validity of backdating the food codes has not previously been attempted, and
we make no attempts here. However, we do note that the MPEDv2, originally created
for 2003-04, was appended with some 800 foods to create the 2005-08 MPED. Thus, if
mapping forward is appropriate then mapping backwards seems reasonable.
A.2 Calculating Reformulated Nutrient Values
The FNDDS codes nutrients that have been updated due to reformulation.3 Reformu-
lation can occur for a whole host of nutrients: water, calories, sodium, fats, etc. We
code a food as reformulated if any of these nutrients we reformulated. The logic being
1MPEDs can be obtained from the ARS-USDA website http://www.ars.usda.gov/Services/docs.
htm?docid=17558.
2For example, there are modification codes for the type of milk used in a scrambled egg in 1994-2008,
whereas no distinction between milk is made in 1989-91.
3The FNDDS corresponding to NHANES 2001–08 can be found on the ARS-USDA website http:
//www.ars.usda.gov/services/docs.htm?docid=12089. We obtained a multi-year version dating back
to 1994 by submitting a request to ARS-USDA.
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that we do not know what or how the food was reformulated (e.g., a change in the type
of oil used in vegetable shortening affects more than one nutrient). We replace values
for calories, sodium, carbohydrates, alcohol, and saturated fat in the 1989-91 CSFII
with the most recent updated value in FNDDS (i.e., if a food was reformulated in 2002
and then again in 2005, we use the 2005 value). As noted in table 1 in the text, these
nutrients directly affect calculation of the HEI-2005. We then replace the MPED values
in the 1989-91 CSFII with those from 2005-08 if the food was reformulated.
A.3 Results Using Two Days of Intake
In this section of the Online Appendix, we investigate the robustness of our analysis to
using two days of dietary intake. Results are in tables A.1 and A.2. We exclude 2001-04
because only one day of intake was reported in 2001-02. It must be noted that the
1989-91 CSFII collected three days of consecutive intake data, whereas 1994-96 CSFII
and 2005-2008 NHANES collected the second day of intake 3-10 days after day one.
For the 1989-91 CSFII, we use the first two days of intake but note that the correlation
between the two days could be much higher than in the later surveys. Finally, all day
one intakes where reported during in-person interviews. Intakes for day two and three
in 19891-91 were collected in a food diary, 1994-96 CSFII was collected via an in-person
interview, and 2005-08 NHANES was collected via telephone.
A.4 Results of DFL Probability Model
Results of the DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux decomposition can be found in table A.3.
A.5 Dominance Results for Counterfactuals and by Edu-
cation
Dominance results for comparing counterfactual distributions are reporting in table A.4.
Results by education level can be found in table A.5.
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Table A.1: Mean Health Eating Index–2005 Scores, Two Days of Intake.
Population 1989-91 1994-96 2005-08
U.S. population 52.35 (13.29)a 53.16 (12.91)a 55.55 (11.72)
[13.43, 91.72] [16.65, 94.85] [11.34, 97.15]
N 7,439 9,323 8,165
low-income 50.76 (18.48)a 51.49 (14.62)a 54.48 (14.09)
[13.43, 89.83] [16.65, 94.85] [11.34, 97.15]
N 3,860 3,236 3,350
Higher-income 52.88 (10.73)ab 53.77 (12.17)ab 55.99 (10.61)b
[15.64, 91.72] [17.84, 93.03] [16.78, 96.83]
N 3,579 6,087 4,815
Standard deviations in parenthesis. Maximum and minimum in brackets.
aWithin-population mean is significantly lower than 2005-08 at 5-percent level.
bWithin-year higher-income is significantly different from low-income at 5-percent level.
Table A.2: Tests of Stochastic Dominance among U.S. Adults, Two Days of Intake
Distribution Bootstrap Tests Two-stage Inferred
A B pˆ−1 pˆ
−
2 pˆ
+
1 pˆ
+
2 p
2S
1,0.1 p
2S
1,0.01 Ranking
U.S. Population
1989-91 1994-96 0.007 0.010 0.900 0.660 0.249 0.141 A ≺1 B∗∗∗
2005-08 0.002 0.000 1.000 0.877 1.000 1.000 A ≺1 B∗∗∗
1994-96 2005-08 0.010 0.003 0.999 0.863 1.000 1.000 A ≺1 B∗∗∗
Low-income
1989-91 1994-96 0.218 0.257 0.570 0.654 0.303 0.182 ND
2005-08 0.008 0.000 1.000 0.882 0.995 0.990 A ≺1 B∗∗∗
1994-96 2005-08 0.006 0.003 0.991 0.855 0.976 0.957 A ≺1 B∗∗∗
Higher-income
1989-91 1994-96 0.007 0.006 0.880 0.684 0.338 0.210 A ≺1 B∗∗∗
2005-08 0.002 0.000 1.000 0.906 1.000 1.000 A ≺1 B∗∗∗
1994-96 2005-08 0.007 0.010 0.991 0.886 0.999 0.998 A ≺1 B∗∗∗
Notes: The pˆ±s values refer to one-sided tests of the null hypothesis H
±
s using equation (7).
The asymptotic p2S1,α values are calculated from (8), where α = 0.1, 0.01. The notation
A ≺s B reads “Distribution B dominates distribution A at order s,” while ND indicates
no dominance at order 1 or 2. Inferred ranking is based on statistical significance levels of
∗∗∗1, ∗∗5, and ∗10%.
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Table A.3: Results of DFL Probability Model
Pr(t = 08|h) Pr(t = 08|e) Pr(t = 08|h, e)
Male -0.001 -0.001
(0.020) (0.020)
Non-Hispanic white, 30− 44 -0.090 -0.104
(0.090) (0.092)
Non-Hispanic white, 45− 64 0.307∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.084)
Non-Hispanic white, 65+ 0.181 0.274∗∗
(0.092) (0.096)
Non-Hispanic black, 20− 29 0.168 0.200
(0.144) (0.147)
Non-Hispanic black, 30− 44 0.100 0.118
(0.149) (0.151)
Non-Hispanic black, 45− 64 0.364∗ 0.426∗∗
(0.151) (0.157)
Non-Hispanic black, 65+ 0.045 0.227
(0.143) (0.156)
Hispanic, 20− 29 0.385∗ 0.522∗∗
(0.148) (0.157)
Hispanic, 30− 44 0.390∗ 0.513∗∗
(0.160) (0.171)
Hispanic, 45− 64 0.498∗∗ 0.658∗∗
(0.187) (0.201)
Hispanic, 65+ 0.349 0.610∗∗
(0.206) (0.209)
Other race/ethnicity, 20− 29 0.386 0.348
(0.203) (0.206)
Other race/ethnicity, 30− 44 0.460∗ 0.442∗
(0.181) (0.184)
Other race/ethnicity, 45− 64 0.942∗∗∗ 0.987∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.168)
Other race/ethnicity, 65+ 0.468 0.616∗
(0.302) (0.307)
Did not attend high school -0.353∗∗∗ -0.568∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.092)
High school, no college -0.261∗∗∗ -0.304∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.060)
Constant 0.016 0.311∗∗∗ 0.153
(0.088) (0.043) (0.095)
Obs. 18,634 18,634 18,634
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.4: Tests of Stochastic Dominance under Reformulation and Counterfactuals
Distribution Bootstrap Tests Two-stage Inferred
A B pˆ−1 pˆ
−
2 pˆ
+
1 pˆ
+
2 p
2S
1,0.1 p
2S
1,0.01 Ranking
U.S. Population
1989-91R 2005-08 0.007 0.000 1.000 0.883 0.981 0.966 A ≺1 B∗∗∗
1989-91R,E 2005-08 0.019 0.001 1.000 0.877 0.985 0.973 A ≺1 B∗∗
1989-91R,H 2005-08 0.043 0.004 1.000 0.865 0.981 0.966 A ≺1 B∗∗
1989-91R,H,E 2005-08 0.167 0.053 0.996 0.852 0.946 0.907 A ≺2 B∗
Low-income
1989-91R 2005-08 0.048 0.006 1.000 0.881 0.998 0.996 A ≺1 B∗∗
1989-91R,E 2005-08 0.070 0.009 0.999 0.879 0.981 0.966 A ≺1 B∗
1989-91R,H 2005-08 0.124 0.048 0.999 0.893 0.998 0.996 A ≺2 B∗∗
1989-91R,H,E 2005-08 0.193 0.113 0.998 0.891 0.998 0.996 ND
Higher-income
1989-91R 2005-08 0.004 0.000 1.000 0.895 0.985 0.973 A ≺1 B∗∗∗
1989-91R,E 2005-08 0.008 0.001 1.000 0.900 0.998 0.996 A ≺1 B∗∗∗
1989-91R,H 2005-08 0.024 0.003 1.000 0.877 0.985 0.973 A ≺1 B∗∗
1989-91R,H,E 2005-08 0.092 0.041 0.988 0.869 0.881 0.809 A ≺1 B∗
Notes: The pˆ±s values refer to one-sided tests of the null hypothesis H
±
s using equation (7).
The asymptotic p2S1,α values are calculated from (8), where α = 0.1, 0.01. The notation
A ≺s B reads “Distribution B dominates distribution A at order s,” while ND indicates
no dominance at order 1 or 2. Inferred ranking is based on statistical significance levels of
∗∗∗1, ∗∗5, and ∗10%. R=reformulation; H=(gender, age, race/ethinicty); E=education
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Table A.5: Tests of Stochastic Dominance among U.S. Adults by Education
Distribution Bootstrap Tests Two-stage Inferred
A B pˆ−1 pˆ
−
2 pˆ
+
1 pˆ
+
2 p
2S
1,0.1 p
2S
1,0.01 Ranking
High school graduate or less
1989-91 1994-96 0.018 0.113 0.583 0.426 0.029 0.010 ND
2001-04 0.103 0.067 0.981 0.978 0.900 0.837 A ≺2 B∗
2005-08 0.009 0.001 0.993 0.855 0.997 0.994 A ≺1 B∗∗∗
1994-96 2001-04 0.132 0.197 0.465 0.938 0.010 0.003 ND
2005-08 0.016 0.012 0.997 0.874 0.997 0.994 A ≺1 B∗∗
2001-04 2005-08 0.151 0.059 0.964 0.787 0.959 0.929 A ≺2 B∗
At least one year of college
1989-91 1994-96 0.105 0.028 1.000 0.869 1.000 1.000 A ≺2 B∗∗
2001-04 0.154 0.043 1.000 0.888 0.999 0.998 A ≺2 B∗∗
2005-08 0.016 0.002 1.000 0.869 0.986 0.975 A ≺1 B∗∗
1994-96 2001-04 0.629 0.472 0.258 0.456 0.000 0.000 ND
2005-08 0.141 0.136 0.777 0.927 0.309 0.186 ND
2001-04 2005-08 0.169 0.085 0.958 0.782 0.818 0.721 A ≺2 B∗
Notes: The pˆ±s values refer to one-sided tests of the null hypothesis H
±
s using equation (7).
The asymptotic p2S1,α values are calculated from (8), where α = 0.1, 0.01. The notation
A ≺s B reads “Distribution B dominates distribution A at order s,” while ND indicates
no dominance at order 1 or 2. Inferred ranking is based on statistical significance levels of
∗∗∗1, ∗∗5, and ∗10%.
Appendix B
“Billions and Billions Served”
Heterogeneous Effects of School
Food and Away Food on Child
Dietary Quality
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B.1 HEI-2005 Standards for Scoring
Table B.1: Healthy Eating Index-2005 Standards for Scoring.
Score
Component 0 5 8 10 20
Total fruit 0 −→ ≥ 0.8 cup eq/1000 kcal
Whole fruit 0 −→ ≥ 0.4 cup eq/1000 kcal
Total vegetables 0 −→ ≥ 1.1 cup eq/1000 kcal
Dark green/orange veg. 0 −→ ≥ 0.4 cup eq/1000 kcal
Total grains 0 −→ ≥ 3.0 cup eq/1000 kcal
Whole grains 0 −→ ≥ 1.5 cup eq/1000 kcal
Milk 0 −−−−−−−−−−−−→ ≥ 1.3 cup eq/1000 kcal
Meats and beans 0 −−−−−−−−−−−−→ ≥ 2.5 oz eq/1000 kcal
Oils 0 −−−−−−−−−−−−→ ≥ 12 g/1000 kcal
Saturated fat ≥ 15 −−−−−→ 10 −−→ ≤ 7% of energy
Sodium ≥ 2.0 −−−−−→ 1.1−−→ ≤ 0.7 g/1000 kcal
Calories from SoFAASa ≥ 50 −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ ≤ 20% of energy
Source: Recreated from Guenther et al. (2007).
aSolid Fat, Alcohol, and Added Sugar
B.2 Food Source Coding
In the descriptions that follow, bracketed numbers refer to the code found in the
NHANES documentation. Food at home (FAH): store [1], grown or caught by you
or someone you know [19], and fish caught by you or someone you know [20]; food from
school (FFS): cafeteria at school [7]; food away from home (FAFH): restaurant with
waiter/waitress [2], restaurant fast food/pizza [3], bar/tavern/lounge [4], restaurant no
additional information [5], cafeteria not at school [6], vending machine [14], common
coffee pot or snack tray [15], from someone else/gift [16], mail order purchase [17], resi-
dential dining facility [18], sport, recreation, or entertainment facility [24], street vendor,
vending truck [25], and fundraiser sales [26].
Contrary to other studies (e.g., Lin and Guthrie, 2013; Mancino et al., 2010), food
from child care centers [8] is not included in FFS becuase this venue does not fall
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under the SBP or NSLP. “Other” food sources were also coded: Community food pro-
grams (family/adult day care center [9], soup kitchen/shelter/food pantry [10], Meals
on Wheels [11], community food program - other [12], community program no addi-
tional information [13]), a catch-all other category (other, specify [91]) and unidentifi-
able responses (don’t know [99]) made up a small proportion of total calorie intake. In
preliminary analyses, I considered these items in a fourth “other” category and found
them to be of relatively equal quality to FAFH. Therefore, these foods are considered
to be FAFH for this research. Please note however, that point estimates are robust to
having a fourth category. Computationally, moving from 3 to 4 categories is not trivial,
as the curse of dimensionality becomes a formidable problem for inference as discussed
in the Estimation section.
B.3 Kernel density
This section shows kernel density estimates of HEI scores for Day 1 and Day 2. In
short, no child is observed scoring a perfect 100 nor the lowest possible score of 0. The
densities are close to normally distributed as indicated by the overlay in figure B.1.
B.4 Adaptive Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) Algo-
rithm
The MCMC algorithm used in this paper is a variant of the Metropolis-Hastings algo-
rithm with vanishing adaptation (see Hunter, 2013). I use T = 2, 500 draws and discard
(burn) the first 500. I use a two-step procedure suggested by Yin (2009) to construct
the weighting matrix according to Bhattacharya (2005): use draws 251-500 during the
burn-in period to construct the mean value bˆ and then construct construct Wn(bˆ). Start-
ing values for the parameters and variance matrix are obtained from equation (3.2), the
standard quantile regression of Koenker and Bassett (1978). Using these starting values
allow for a smaller burn-in window and quicker adaptation. The proposal distribution
is a multivariate Normal density with a targeted acceptance rate of 0.4. Adaptation is
achieved through a damping parameter δ ∈ (0, 1) which controls how quickly the tuning
mechanism decays through ρt =
1
(1+t)δ
. Here, δ = 2/3. Finally, the scaling parameter
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Figure B.1: Kernel Density Estimates of HEI-2005 scores by Day
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Note: Silverman’s rule resulted in a bandwidth selection of approximately 3.5 for both days. The kernel
is Epanechnikov. The diamond and circle indicate Day 1 and Day 2 medians, respectively.
is λ = 2.83
2
d where d is the number of parameters to be estimated.
The figure below reports the Markov chain sequence of draws (β(1), . . . , β(T )) for
each parameter at τ = 0.5. The kernel densities show the distribution of the posterior
distribution from which point estimates (the mean) and inferences (the fifth and ninety-
fifth quantiles) are drawn.
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Figure B.2: Markov Chain Monte Carlo Performance at the Median
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vertical lines are the 5th and the 95th percentiles of the quasi-posterior distribution.
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B.4.1 Results for Selected Quantiles
Table B.2: Fixed Effects Quantile Regression Results
FFS FAFH
Quantile Estimate 95% CI Estimate 95% CI
5 5.026 (1.535, 8.078) 2.278 (0.780, 3.765)
10 5.106 (3.627, 6.717) 0.867 (-0.999, 2.867)
15 2.729 (0.769, 4.665) -0.009 (-1.208, 1.023)
20 0.028 (-2.520, 3.168) -1.198 (-2.331, 0.240)
25 -0.474 (-3.242, 2.971) -0.019 (-1.604, 1.185)
30 -0.068 (-3.336, 2.960) -0.851 (-2.398, 0.491)
35 -0.054 (-3.032, 3.106) -1.514 (-2.688, -0.160)
40 -0.672 (-4.251, 2.723) -2.782 (-3.797, -1.745)
45 -1.888 (-4.542, 0.694) -4.188 (-5.351, -3.083)
50 -1.803 (-4.816, 0.852) -4.978 (-6.217, -3.732)
55 -0.736 (-2.424, 1.083) -6.133 (-7.175, -4.950)
60 -0.350 (-3.007, 2.123) -6.614 (-8.436, -4.915)
65 -0.016 (-2.421, 2.271) -6.899 (-8.278, -5.344)
70 -1.140 (-4.063, 1.481) -6.707 (-8.162, -5.096)
75 -0.591 (-3.624, 2.151) -7.653 (-9.052, -6.340)
80 -1.949 (-4.667, 0.801) -8.499 (-9.833, -6.861)
85 -3.248 (-6.888, 0.620) -10.219 (-11.935, -8.473)
90 -4.407 (-7.619, -0.465) -10.024 (-11.987, -8.312)
95 -3.077 (-5.789, -0.138) -11.722 (-13.450, -10.099)
Note: Dependent variable the HEI-2005. Estimates are from equation (3.9) using
Powell’s (2014) Quantile Regression for Panel Data (QRPD).
B.4.2 Comparing QRPD to standard quantile regression
The QRPD estimator uses two moment conditions (equations (4.6) and (3.11)) to esti-
mation the structural quantile function (SQF) found in equation (3.3). The standard
quantile regression (QR) of Koenker and Bassett (1978) can also be used to estimate the
same SQF using a single moment condition. To see this, define 1T
∑T
s=1 1(Yis ≤ D′isb)
in equation (4.6) as τi(b). This quantity is the fraction of the times individual i’s out-
come is below D′isb. QR sets τi(b) = τ for all individuals which ignores the fact that
we observe each person multiple times. This is analogous to treating each person as a
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separate cross-sectional observation. The single (weighted) moment condition for QR is
therefore
gi(b) = wiDit
[
1(Yit ≤ D′itb)− τ
]
(B.1)
and estimation again proceeds in the GMM framework. Recall that D ≡ (γ1, . . . , γT , X)
where γt refers to the t
th day of intake on the hth day of the week andX = (FFS, FAFH)
are the policy variables of interest.
To show how using the additional information for each person affects results, I
report estimates from the standard cross-sectional quantile regression (QR) in red in
figures B.3 and B.4. The solid black lines are results from Powell’s (2014) QRPD, which
are replicated from the text. The dashed lines are individual fixed-effect OLS estimates
from column (4) of table 3.3.
Figure B.3: Impact of Food From School (FFS) under Alternative Specifications
-5
0
5
10
H
EI
 p
oi
nt
s
0 20 40 60 80 100
Quantile
OLS-FE QRPD QR
Note: Dietary quality is measured using the HEI-2005. OLS-FE are fixed effect estimates from column
(4) of table 3.3. QR refers to the cross-sectional quantile regression using equation (B.1). QRPD is
estimated from equation (3.9).
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Figure B.4: Impact of Food Away from Home (FAFH) under Alternative Specifications
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Note: Dietary quality is measured using the HEI-2005. OLS-FE are fixed effect estimates from column
(4) of table 3.3. QR refers to the cross-sectional quantile regression in equation (B.1). QRPD is
estimated from equation (3.9).
Appendix C
Cashing Out SNAP:
Heterogeneous Impacts on
Dietary Quantity and Quality
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C.1 HEI-2005 Standards for Scoring
Table C.1: Healthy Eating Index-2005 Standards for Scoring.
Score
Component 0 5 8 10 20
Total fruit 0 −→ ≥ 0.8 cup eq/1000 kcal
Whole fruit 0 −→ ≥ 0.4 cup eq/1000 kcal
Total vegetables 0 −→ ≥ 1.1 cup eq/1000 kcal
Dark green/orange veg. 0 −→ ≥ 0.4 cup eq/1000 kcal
Total grains 0 −→ ≥ 3.0 cup eq/1000 kcal
Whole grains 0 −→ ≥ 1.5 cup eq/1000 kcal
Milk 0 −−−−−−−−−−−−→ ≥ 1.3 cup eq/1000 kcal
Meats and beans 0 −−−−−−−−−−−−→ ≥ 2.5 oz eq/1000 kcal
Oils 0 −−−−−−−−−−−−→ ≥ 12 g/1000 kcal
Saturated fat ≥ 15 −−−−−→ 10 −−→ ≤ 7% of energy
Sodium ≥ 2.0 −−−−−→ 1.1−−→ ≤ 0.7 g/1000 kcal
Calories from SoFAASa ≥ 50 −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ ≤ 20% of energy
Source: Recreated from Guenther et al. (2007).
aSolid Fat, Alcohol, and Added Sugar
C.2 Calculating Food Pattern Equivalents in the San Diego
data
This section describes our methodology for constructing food pattern equivalents for
the 32 food groups reported in the San Diego data. Most mappings are self-explanatory
and have a direct correspondence. The mapping of grains and meats warrants some
discussion.
High-fiber grains were defined based on the definitions found in (Carlson et al.,
2003, 2007). In 1990, high-fiber cereals corresponded to 0.8 grams of fiber per ounce,
and high-fiber breads corresponded to 1.2 grams of fiber per ounce; no threshold was
given for the flour, meal, rice and pasta group. (Carlson et al., 2003). In Carlson et
al. (2007), the definition of high-fiber grains for all groups was defined as “more than
50% of ounce equivalents from whole grain.” Therefore, we follow Carlson et al., (2003)
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when defining high-fiber breakfast cereals and breads since these definitions most closely
resemble those used in the 1990. We follow Carlson et al., (2007) when defining high-
fiber flour, meal, rice and pasta group since no definition of high-fiber was given in either
the San Diego data nor Carlson et al., (2003). We note that the distribution of whole
grains in the flour, meal, rice and pasta group is extremely bi-modal, either containing
0% whole grains or 75% or more.
Low-costs meats are those in the bottom 33% of the price distribution (Carlson et
al., 2003, 2007). We have price data from USDA’s successor intake surveys, the 2001-02
and 2003-04 National Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys (NHANES), but not
specifically for the 1989-91 CSFII. However, both NHANES datasets roughly yield the
same low-cost meats, which seems reasonable if relative prices remain stable. In 2001-02
(2003-04), the real price threshold for low-cost meats was $3.01/lb ($3.55/lb). Using the
CPI for meats from the BLS, these prices correspond to a low-cost threshold of about
$2.50/lb in 1990. In general, low-cost meats include (in roughly increasing price) wild
game, ground and patty meats, canned meats, corned beef, beef brisket, pork and beef
roasts, smoked/cured hams, barbecued short-ribs, and broiled/baked pork cutlets.
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Table C.2: Mapping of San Diego food groups to CSFII food groups
San Diego food groups CSFII food groups (codes)1,2
Potatoes white potatoes & Puerto Rican starchy vegetables (71)
High nutrient vegs dark-green (72) and deep-yellow (73) vegetables
Other vegetables tomatoes (74) and other vegetables (75)
Mixtures, mostly vegs; condiments vegetable baby food (76), vegetable with meat (77)
Vitamin C-rich fruit citrus fruits, juices (61)
Other fruit dried fruits (62), other fruits (63), juices not citrus (64),
fruit baby food (67)
High-fiber breakfast cereals3 cereals, not cooked (57)
Other breakfast cereals3 cereals, not cooked (57)
High-fiber flour, meal, rice, pasta4 flour and dry mixes (50), pastas, cooked cereals, rice (56)
Other flour, meal, rice, pasta4 flour and dry mixes (50), pastas, cooked cereals, rice (56)
High-fiber bread3 yeast breads, rolls (51), quick breads (52)
Other bread3 yeast breads, rolls (51), quick breads (52)
Bakery products, not bread cakes, cookies, pies, pastries (53), crackers and salty
snacks from grain products (54), pancakes, waﬄes,
french toast, other (55)
Grain mixtures grain mixtures, frozen plate meals and soups
mainly grain (58)
Milk, yogurt Milk and milk drinks - includes yogurt (11)
Cheese cheeses (14)
Cream; mixtures mostly milk creams and cream sub. (12), milk desserts, sauces,
gravies (13)
Low-cost red meat, variety meat5 meat (20), beef (21), pork (22, excludes bacon (226)),
lamb, veal, game, other carcass meat (23)
High-cost red meat, variety meats5 meat (20), beef (21), pork (22, excludes bacon(226)),
lamb, veal, game, other carcass meat (23)
Poultry poultry (24)
Fish, shellfish fish and shellfish (26)
Bacon, sausage, lunch meats bacon (226), organ meats, sausages, lunchmeats,
spreads (25)
Eggs eggs (31), egg mixtures (32), egg sub. (33), egg baby food
(34), frozen plate meals with egg as major ingredient (35)
Dry beans, peas, lentils legumes (41), seeds & mixtures (43), carob products (44)
Mixtures, mostly meat etc. meat, poultry, fish with nonmeat items (27), frozen plate
meals, soups, gravies with meat, poultry, fish gelatins (28)
Nuts, peanut butter nuts, nut butters, and nut mixtures (42)
Fats, oils fats (81), oils (82), salad dressings (83)
Sugar, sweets sugars and sweets (91)
Seasonings no nutritional value
Soft drinks, punches, ades soft drinks (924), fruitaids (925), nonfruit bev. (926),
powdered mix bev. (927), nonalcoholic bev. (928), bev.
concentrates (929)
Coffee, tea coffee (921), coffee sub. (922), tea (923)
Alcohol alcoholic beverages (93)
1See USDA (1991, page 97–110) for details of food groups and coding.
2Food codes in CSFII are 8 digits. Numbers in this table represent the first two (or three)
digits of these codes.
3Breakfast cereals and breads are defined as high-fiber according to Carlson et al. (2003).
4Flour, meal, rice and pasta are defined as high-fiber according to Carlson et al. (2007).
5Low- and high-cost meats are based on CNPP price database and definitions used
in Carlson et al. (2003).
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Table C.3: OLS Results at mean of kilocalories
(2) (3) (4) (5)
cash -92.064 -91.755 -107.969 -40.248
(66.957) (67.068) (67.089) (54.223)
white nh 87.135 65.593 27.737 178.266∗
(110.068) (115.566) (116.311) (94.332)
black nh 353.472∗∗∗ 334.928∗∗∗ 334.757∗∗∗ 433.077∗∗∗
(120.752) (124.805) (124.640) (100.639)
hispanic 163.487 158.957 155.332 180.401∗∗
(110.905) (111.391) (111.467) (90.070)
age head 4.007 3.803 5.423 0.335
(3.596) (3.611) (4.129) (3.337)
fem head 123.009 120.201 139.523 280.659∗∗∗
(113.957) (114.543) (116.576) (94.227)
married -303.752∗∗∗ -299.437∗∗∗ -194.782∗∗ -184.725∗∗
(83.001) (83.741) (93.186) (75.463)
less hs -57.422 -24.687 40.686
(83.787) (84.367) (68.695)
hs grad -38.035 -34.597 45.383
(90.338) (90.276) (73.072)
working -17.668 24.726 56.513
(84.246) (86.400) (70.817)
infant 74.251 146.455∗
(90.618) (76.193)
toddler 65.123 122.851∗
(90.788) (73.346)
adol 95.158 71.841
(91.879) (74.144)
teen -9.797 -3.644
(93.229) (75.230)
single -3.911 89.517
(81.328) (65.943)
lnsize -348.060∗∗∗ -980.899∗∗∗
(129.164) (109.903)
amtpaid 16.710∗∗∗
(0.772)
amtprod gift 20.605∗∗∗
(2.897)
amtwic 10.600∗
(6.048)
amtaway 1.763
(1.614)
nonfood exp -0.256∗∗
(0.102)
cons 2214.279∗∗∗ 2271.766∗∗∗ 2480.040∗∗∗ 1922.301∗∗∗
(195.593) (211.894) (242.139) (199.770)
Observations 1062 1062 1062 1062
R-squared 0.035 0.035 0.047 0.383
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.4: OLS Results at mean of HEI-2005
(2) (3) (4) (5)
cash 0.280 0.305 0.306 0.412
(0.455) (0.453) (0.453) (0.449)
white nh -1.226 -1.865∗∗ -1.895∗∗ -1.562∗∗
(0.747) (0.781) (0.785) (0.781)
black nh -5.754∗∗∗ -6.310∗∗∗ -6.362∗∗∗ -6.148∗∗∗
(0.820) (0.843) (0.842) (0.834)
hispanic -0.424 -0.541 -0.675 -0.747
(0.753) (0.753) (0.753) (0.746)
age head 0.036 0.030 0.061∗∗ 0.054∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028)
fem head 1.105 1.107 0.930 1.127
(0.774) (0.774) (0.787) (0.780)
married 1.416∗∗ 1.488∗∗∗ 1.436∗∗ 1.284∗∗
(0.564) (0.566) (0.629) (0.625)
less hs -1.794∗∗∗ -1.828∗∗∗ -1.929∗∗∗
(0.566) (0.570) (0.569)
hs grad -1.307∗∗ -1.242∗∗ -1.180∗
(0.610) (0.610) (0.605)
working 0.194 0.303 0.570
(0.569) (0.583) (0.587)
infant 1.715∗∗∗ 1.629∗∗∗
(0.612) (0.631)
toddler -0.078 0.000
(0.613) (0.607)
adol -0.079 -0.126
(0.620) (0.614)
teen -0.545 -0.528
(0.630) (0.623)
single 0.698 0.757
(0.549) (0.546)
lnsize 0.723 -0.087
(0.872) (0.910)
amtpaid 0.031∗∗∗
(0.006)
amtprod gift -0.005
(0.024)
amtwic 0.088∗
(0.050)
amtaway -0.030∗∗
(0.013)
nonfood exp -0.001
(0.001)
cons 49.004∗∗∗ 50.570∗∗∗ 48.359∗∗∗ 47.937∗∗∗
(1.328) (1.432) (1.635) (1.655)
Observations 1062 1062 1062 1062
R-squared 0.089 0.098 0.110 0.134
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.5: Proneness results at 10th quantile of kilocalories
GQR-1 GQR-2 GQR-3 GQR-4
white nh -0.000 -0.009 -0.005 -0.019
(0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031)
black nh -0.011 -0.020 -0.021 -0.021
(0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.033)
hispanic -0.012 -0.015 -0.012 -0.010
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030)
age head 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
fem head -0.057∗ -0.057∗ -0.058∗ -0.073∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031)
married 0.007 0.010 -0.007 0.003
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.025)
less hs -0.008 -0.010 -0.021
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
hs grad 0.040 0.039 0.032
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
working 0.009 -0.004 0.009
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023)
infant -0.059∗∗ -0.056∗∗
(0.025) (0.025)
toddler -0.022 -0.023
(0.025) (0.024)
adol -0.022 -0.021
(0.025) (0.025)
teen -0.003 0.005
(0.026) (0.025)
single -0.001 -0.021
(0.023) (0.022)
lnsize 0.052 0.126∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036)
amtpaid -0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)
amtprod gift -0.002∗
(0.001)
amtwic -0.004∗
(0.002)
amtaway -0.000
(0.001)
nonfood exp -0.000
(0.000)
cons 0.151∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗ 0.158∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.058) (0.066) (0.065)
Observations 1062 1062 1062 1062
R-squared 0.005 0.009 0.016 0.091
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.6: Proneness results at 50th quantile of kilocalories
GQR-1 GQR-2 GQR-3 GQR-4
white nh -0.076 -0.083 -0.064 -0.104∗∗
(0.050) (0.052) (0.053) (0.048)
black nh -0.145∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.057) (0.056) (0.051)
hispanic -0.092∗ -0.095∗ -0.090∗ -0.083∗
(0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.046)
age head -0.002 -0.002 -0.004∗∗ -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
fem head -0.121∗∗ -0.124∗∗ -0.135∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.048)
married 0.105∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.062 0.071∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.042) (0.038)
less hs 0.001 -0.010 -0.043
(0.038) (0.038) (0.035)
hs grad 0.044 0.031 0.016
(0.041) (0.041) (0.037)
working -0.027 -0.040 -0.062∗
(0.038) (0.039) (0.036)
infant -0.087∗∗ -0.088∗∗
(0.041) (0.039)
toddler -0.002 -0.019
(0.041) (0.037)
adol -0.073∗ -0.065∗
(0.042) (0.038)
teen 0.044 0.048
(0.042) (0.038)
single -0.016 -0.044
(0.037) (0.034)
lnsize 0.133∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.056)
amtpaid -0.005∗∗∗
(0.000)
amtprod gift -0.005∗∗∗
(0.001)
amtwic -0.006∗
(0.003)
amtaway -0.001
(0.001)
nonfood exp 0.000∗
(0.000)
cons 0.726∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.095) (0.109) (0.101)
Observations 1062 1062 1062 1062
R-squared 0.029 0.031 0.047 0.221
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.7: Proneness results at 90th quantile of kilocalories
GQR-1 GQR-2 GQR-3 GQR-4
white nh -0.013 -0.006 -0.001 -0.013
(0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.029)
black nh -0.064∗ -0.058∗ -0.055 -0.074∗∗
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031)
hispanic -0.029 -0.027 -0.028 -0.029
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.028)
age head 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
fem head 0.014 0.012 -0.002 -0.030
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.029)
married 0.046∗∗ 0.045∗ 0.022 0.018
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023)
less hs 0.008 -0.007 -0.000
(0.023) (0.023) (0.021)
hs grad -0.023 -0.025 -0.026
(0.025) (0.025) (0.023)
working -0.020 -0.026 -0.024
(0.023) (0.024) (0.022)
infant 0.014 0.002
(0.025) (0.024)
toddler 0.001 -0.005
(0.025) (0.023)
adol -0.011 -0.004
(0.025) (0.023)
teen -0.006 -0.006
(0.026) (0.023)
single 0.021 0.010
(0.022) (0.021)
lnsize 0.092∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.034)
amtpaid -0.003∗∗∗
(0.000)
amtprod gift -0.005∗∗∗
(0.001)
amtwic -0.002
(0.002)
amtaway -0.001
(0.001)
nonfood exp 0.000∗∗
(0.000)
cons 0.898∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗∗ 0.801∗∗∗ 0.873∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.058) (0.066) (0.062)
Observations 1062 1062 1062 1062
R-squared 0.010 0.012 0.026 0.194
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.8: Proneness results at 10th quantile of HEI-2005
GQR-1 GQR-2 GQR-3 GQR-4
white nh -0.014 0.016 0.016 0.007
(0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
black nh 0.177∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
hispanic -0.024 -0.018 -0.013 -0.016
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
age head -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
fem head -0.019 -0.017 -0.014 -0.021
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
married -0.032 -0.038∗ -0.019 -0.020
(0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
less hs 0.075∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
hs grad 0.035 0.031 0.031
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
working 0.007 0.015 -0.000
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
infant -0.036 -0.035
(0.024) (0.025)
toddler 0.046∗ 0.038
(0.024) (0.024)
adol -0.026 -0.032
(0.024) (0.024)
teen 0.062∗∗ 0.057∗∗
(0.025) (0.025)
single -0.008 -0.014
(0.022) (0.022)
lnsize -0.062∗ -0.019
(0.034) (0.036)
amtpaid -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
amtprod gift -0.001
(0.001)
amtwic -0.002
(0.002)
amtaway 0.000
(0.001)
nonfood exp 0.000
(0.000)
cons 0.119∗∗ 0.052 0.115∗ 0.133∗∗
(0.052) (0.056) (0.064) (0.065)
Observations 1062 1062 1062 1062
R-squared 0.072 0.081 0.100 0.115
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.9: Proneness results at 50th quantile of HEI-2005
GQR-1 GQR-2 GQR-3 GQR-4
white nh 0.060 0.076 0.083 0.065
(0.049) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
black nh 0.265∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
hispanic 0.000 0.002 0.013 0.019
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
age head -0.003∗ -0.003 -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
fem head -0.057 -0.063 -0.061 -0.075
(0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052)
married -0.068∗ -0.066∗ -0.069∗ -0.064
(0.037) (0.038) (0.042) (0.042)
less hs 0.052 0.053 0.060
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
hs grad 0.052 0.051 0.049
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
working -0.054 -0.065∗ -0.085∗∗
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039)
infant -0.134∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.042)
toddler -0.017 -0.029
(0.041) (0.040)
adol 0.019 0.020
(0.041) (0.041)
teen 0.008 0.004
(0.042) (0.042)
single -0.022 -0.024
(0.036) (0.036)
lnsize 0.005 0.060
(0.058) (0.061)
amtpaid -0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)
amtprod gift 0.000
(0.002)
amtwic -0.003
(0.003)
amtaway 0.001
(0.001)
nonfood exp 0.000
(0.000)
cons 0.583∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.094) (0.107) (0.109)
Observations 1062 1062 1062 1062
R-squared 0.051 0.055 0.068 0.083
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.10: Proneness results at 90th quantile of HEI-2005
GQR-1 GQR-2 GQR-3 GQR-4
white nh 0.038 0.042 0.042 0.041
(0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
black nh 0.055∗ 0.058∗ 0.059∗ 0.058∗
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
hispanic 0.046 0.046 0.048 0.049
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031)
age head -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
fem head 0.011 0.010 0.015 0.015
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
married -0.033 -0.031 -0.034 -0.031
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026)
less hs 0.022 0.023 0.025
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
hs grad 0.039 0.039 0.038
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
working -0.013 -0.018 -0.021
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
infant -0.037 -0.027
(0.025) (0.026)
toddler -0.014 -0.012
(0.025) (0.025)
adol -0.003 -0.002
(0.025) (0.025)
teen -0.000 -0.000
(0.026) (0.026)
single -0.016 -0.015
(0.022) (0.023)
lnsize 0.001 0.000
(0.035) (0.037)
amtpaid -0.000
(0.000)
amtprod gift 0.000
(0.001)
amtwic -0.003
(0.002)
amtaway 0.001
(0.001)
nonfood exp 0.000
(0.000)
cons 0.870∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗ 0.895∗∗∗ 0.894∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.057) (0.066) (0.068)
Observations 1062 1062 1062 1062
R-squared 0.008 0.011 0.014 0.016
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure C.1: Measures of calories from two data sources
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Figure C.2: Measures of saturated fat from two data sources
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Figure C.3: Cash Out Effect on the Distribution of Kilocalories
-8
00
-6
00
-4
00
-2
00
0
20
0
40
0
ki
lo
ca
lo
rie
s
0 20 40 60 80 100
quantile
QR GQR-1
QR 90% CI GQR 90% CI
129
Figure C.4: Cash Out Effect on the Distribution of Kilocalories
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Figure C.5: Cash Out Effect on the Distribution of Kilocalories
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Figure C.6: Cash Out Effect on the Distribution of HEI scores
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Figure C.7: Cash Out Effect on the Distribution of HEI scores
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Figure C.8: Cash Out Effect on the Distribution of HEI scores
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